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The object of this thesis is the explanation and prediction of the freight rates that prevail
in the tanker market. The investigation is conducted in three steps: The demanded tanker
capacity is studied first, then the available tanker fleet and finally the prevailing freight
rates. The analytical tool used in the thesis is linear regression analysis. The collected
data covers a period of 10 years (Jan. 1983 - Dec. 1992). The first study establishes
that the industrial production of the most industrialized countries has a high explanatory
power when demanded transportation capacity is the explained variable. Gross National
Product is also investigated as an explanatory variable. The second study establishes the
relation between scrappage rate and past prevailing freight rates. The explanatory power
of the age of fleet is also investigated. The third study explores the relation between
tanker availability, tanker demand and freight rates. The resulting relations from the
three studies are integrated in a program for forecasting tanker freight rates. Finally the
predicted values generated by the program are presented, covering the period of the next
two years.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Model
A computer model describing and predicting tanker market behavior is an indispensable
tool for everyone that wants to deeply understand this market. Many analyses on this
field have already been published. However, since the tanker market is in a continuous
changing mode, an updated analysis is necessary.
New technologies introduced in shipbuilding, changes in the opinion of shipowners on
how large ships should be, the attitude of their clients chartering ships for smaller periods
of time, the deepening of ports and the widening of channels, as well as new oil consuming
and producing areas resulting in the emergence of new trade routes are some of the factors
that make the tanker market change every day.
Finally, those who were reluctant to announce the "end of history" during the early 90's
and supported the idea that markets would never lose their equilibrium due to uncertainty,
were proved wrong just 18 months later when Iraq invaded Kuwait, causing freight rates
to triple and thus closing one more cycle 1 of the oil tanker market. More information on
how the market mechanisms work and from what it is influenced, the main futures that
characterize tankers and their impact on economic decisions (expected freight rate for the
particular vessel), from both charters and shipowners, will be given in Chapter 1, section
2.
Although the tanker market is characterized by a continuously changing structure, the
1A cycle in tanker market is the period between two "booms" . These "booms" last a few months and
freight rates are 3 and more times higher than those experienced in an equilibrium market.
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main rules on how the tanker market functions and the main factors that influence it stay
the same. A brief look on previous investigations that describe and validate these rules is
done in Chapter 1 , section 3.
Despite the difficulties that were introduced by the changing nature of tanker mar-
ket, the development of new ways of obtaining information allowed us to gather enough
market data covering the past 10 years (1983 - 1993). Also, using regression analysis as
a mathematical tool, a satisfactory degree of analysis was achieved, thus revealing the
mechanisms that characterize the function of this market. A brief review on regression
analysis as a mathematical tool will be given at Chapter 1, section 4.
In this thesis, having understood the market mechanisms, a model will be developed.
The model will analyze tanker demand for the past 10 years (Chapter 2, section 2).
Tanker demand will be expressed in terms of the industrial production index of the most
industrialized countries, allowing us to project it to the future.
Tanker availability will be discussed in Chapter 2, section 3. Scrappage rate categorized
by size will be investigated and its relation with spot rates and age of the fleet will be
retrieved. Then, in Chapter 2, section 4, we will define freight rates in the spot market as
a relation of tanker availability and tanker demand. All the above factors that define the
tanker market behavior will be combined, thus forming our model. A validation of the
model will be performed by comparing the actual data for the period of June 1993 - May
1994 with the ones predicted by the developed model.
Having derived formulas projecting tanker demand (assuming industrial production
index known) and tanker availability (assuming that we know the scheduled deliveries for
the next 2 years and using our conclusions from our investigation on scrappage rates), we
will try to forecast freight rates for the next two years. Three different scenarios will be
assumed on what will be the industrial production of the U.S.A., Japan and O.E.C.D.
The best, mediocre and worst scenarios will define the sensitivity of tanker freight rates
on tanker demand. (Chapter 2 , section 5). Also suggestions for future developments of
the model will be given (Chapter 2, section 6).
Finally, in Chapter 3, the conclusions of our investigations will be given.
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1.2 Elements of the Tanker Market.
The following is a brief description of specific aspects of the tanker market. They are
given as an attempt to define the mechanics of this market and the factors that influence
it in a qualitative sense.
* Ships in spot market constitute the 90% of the total capacity, in contrast with
what was happening in 70's, where the 85% of the tonnage was under long-term
chartering. Also 68% of the fleet capacity is owned by independent owners (and not
by big oil companies).
* Political instability : The Middle East, one of the most unstable region on Earth,
contains the largest portion of oil resources that can be exploited. Political events,
such as war, naturally affect oil prices and freight rates. A few examples follow:
1. Oil crisis of 1974: In the three-year period up to the emergence of the effects of
the first oil crisis in 1974, world seaborne oil movements grew at an annual rate
of 7.0% . In 1975 there was a decline of 7%. There then followed a four-year
period when growth averaged 5.0% p.a.
2. Oil crisis of 1979-1983 : The decline in oil demand was greater and more
prolonged than almost all forecasters had predicted.
3. Iraq-Iran war: There was an unusual peak in the middle of 1984 which was
brought about by the increase in hostilities between Iran and Iraq in the Gulf.
We may perceive by looking at freight rates in the spot market that they climb
passed break-even levels. This may have been so, but it should be noted that
the voyage costs do not include any extra war risk insurance which may have
been paid by the owner.
4. Iraq-Kuwait War: In 1992 Iraq invaded Kuwait, directly controlling by this
action 20% of OPEC production and 20% of world oil reserves. Attributed
to the disruption and the embargo, four million barrels of oil per day were
abruptly removed from the world oil market. The sharp price rise of oil was
driven not only by the supply lost itself, but also by anxiety and fear for the
future.
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When, in late September 1990 Hussein threatened to destroy the Saudi petroleum
supply system, prices in the system market leaped toward $40 per barrel, more
than double what they had been before crisis. The high prices reinforced re-
cessionary trends in the U.S. economy.
By December 1990, the lost production had been completely compensated by
increased production of other sources. Saudi Arabia alone brought three million
barrels per day into production. At the same time, demand was weakening, as
the United States and other countries headed into economic recession, which
reduced the demand of oil.
* Slow steaming : Voyage costs may be reduced by slow-steaming by 4.4% per ton
of cargo (for a medium-sized tanker 90 - 175,000 DWT) . This tactic was followed
in the early 1980's, when the market was depressed and shipowners cut ship's speed
down to 11 knots from the designed one of 15.9 knots. Slow-steaming reduces the
number of voyages per annum to a lesser extent on the shorter routes trade, and
therefore gross revenues are less adversely affected in these trades.
* Technological improvements : After 1980, a new generation of fuel-efficient
tankers was introduced. Higher degree of automation diminished operation costs.
Finally, the new generation tankers were able to carry both crude oil and refined
products.
* Competition in other markets (from other ship sizes): Specially during times
of low rates, tankers do not operate in precisely defined markets from which all
other sizes are excluded. This is particularly the case for medium - sized tankers.
They may be found operating in routes where limited port facilities would normally
dictate the use of much smaller ships, or loading from ports where the great majority
of crude oil exports could be lifted by the much larger VLCC's [2].
* Suez Canal : Limitation in draft obliges a 250,000 DWT tanker (VLCC), fully
laden to go around Cape of Good Hope. In its return (under ballast), it may go
through Suez Canal. On the other hand, a 120,000 tons tanker may go through Suez
Canal both ways (fully laden and in ballast in its return). There is no schedule to
further develop the Suez Canal, to handle fully ladden VLCC's. A rough estimation
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of Suez Canal traffic is 62.1 million tons of oil. Restrictions: Draft (T) <18.29m.
* Panama Canal : Similar to Suez Canal, it presents some restrictions on the size
of the ship that is able to go through it. Restrictions: Length (L)<290 m, Beam
(B)<32.3 m (106 ft), Draft (T)<13 m. Optimized ship designs for Panama Canal
crossing, carrying the maximum possible cargo and giving less importance to hull
resistance formed a special class of ships, the Panamax.
* Economy of scale : Larger tankers mean less operating costs per transported ton.
This advantage may be lost by the inflexibility of larger tankers due to their greater
draft and the greater difficulty of finding full cargoes.
* Other ship characteristics : Apart from the above characteristics (size - economy
of scale, draft and beam - access in ports and Canals), additional ship characteristics
that influence its utilization and profitability per voyage, are:
1. Speed : In general, the faster the ship, the more oil it can deliver. Optimum
speed for each voyage depends upon operational costs, the price of fuel being
the driving factor, ship's loading condition, market conditions (crew salaries,
freight rates), ship's resistance characteristics etc.
2. Power plant: The main categories of power plants in tankers are two: diesel
engines and steam turbines. As the latter presents higher maintenance and
acquisition cost and lower efficiency, and technology advances offers the op-
tion of high-output diesels , most of newbuildings are equipped with a diesel
propulsion plant.
3. Pumping capability: Capacity of ship's pumps to load/unload oil. It is propor-
tional to the time the ship has to spend in harbor (and pay port fees).
4. Flag of convenience: during the recession years (after 1979) most of shipowners
did not even achieved break-even freights, but there are also many owners of
Convenience flag tonnage with very low operating costs who would, therefore,
may have been in a better than break-even position. For a 70,000 DWT tanker
(PANAMAX size), changing its flag to a Convenience flag, would have caused
in 1993 a reduction of 13% on its operating costs (from 3,700 U.S.$/d down to
3,230 U.S.$/d).
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· Newbuilding Market : In the early 70's newbuilding prices were fairly stable at
about $15 million for a tanker of just under 100,000 dwt and about $20 million for
one of 150,000 dwt. The massive ordering boom of VLCC's in 1972 and 1973 also
forced prices sharply higher for medium-sized tankers. Between 1971 and the end
of 1973 the rise in price was 40%-50%.
The virtual halt in ordering which followed, and cancellation of many orders, brought
about a reversal of prices, but only to levels which were still 25%-30% above 1971
levels.
The next surge in ordering occurred in 1979/80, and by the end of 1980 prices had
risen by 100%-150% from their 1975 levels and were about three times their 1971
levels.
During the period 1980-85 there has been little contracting of medium-sized tanker
newbuildings, and prices have fallen by more than 40% from their peak 1980 levels.
The downward pressure on prices caused by low ordering levels has been increased
recently by competition to the historically dominant Japanese yards from builders
in low-cost countries such as Korea, Taiwan and China. Prices for combined carri-
ers have normally been some 5%-10% higher than those for tankers, although the
premium at times has been as much as 20% (in 1977 and 1980) and even 25%-30%
(1975/76).
· Secondhand Market : The peaks in sale and purchase activity have generally
occurred at times of rising secondhand prices: 1972/3, 1976, 1979/80 and late 1983.
In both 1972 and 1973 over 3% of the fleet was sold, compared with less than one
per cent in 1971 and 1974. In the early 1980's between 5.5% and 7.5% were sold
each peak year, compared with three to four per cent in other years. Prices fluctuate
enormously. At the end of 1976 a five year old ship of 135,000 dwt could be sold
for around $14 million, having risen from $10 million at the beginning of the year.
In the depressed markets of 1977/78 the price fell back to below $10 million. Then,
through the next two years, there was a steady rise up to almost $20 million. By
mid-1983, however, prices had fallen to between $11 and $12 million.
· Types of freights : The following types of chartering exist in the tanker market:
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1. Single-Voyage: The vessel is hired to move cargo from one port to another for
only one voyage and on specific dates. Shipowner pays all the operation costs
of the ship.
2. Consecutive-Voyage: As above, shipowner pays all the operation costs of the
ship, only the chartering is for a series of successive voyages.
3. Time Charter: Ship is hired for a period of time, usually one to three years.
Maintenance costs and crew salaries are paid by the shipowner. Fuel and port
fees are paid by the charterer. The charterer has the operational control of the
ship which he may use as he pleases, within the limits of maritime prudence and
safe navigation. Charterer is obliged to return the ship to its owner for a number
of days each year for the sake of proper maintenance. The number of days
are pre-arranged and the shipowner is not paid during this period (off-hired
period). The charterer may relet the ship. Also the agreement specifies the
fuel consumption of the ship at its service speed. If this is exceeded, shipowner
has to pay compensation. If this is less than the expected, shipowner may be
refunded. Therefore, the risk of performance of the vessel goes to the owner
and the risk of change in fuel oil prices goes to the charterer.
4. Contract of Affreightment: a shipowner accepts the obligation of transporting
a certain amount of oil from one port to another in a specific time period. He
may use whatever ships he likes. Usually oil is delivered on a monthly basis,
with some flexibility allowed, provided that at the end of the time period, the
full amount will have been delivered.
5. Bareboat charter: Shipowner provides to the charterer only the ship, without
crew, fuel or stores. Operational and maintenance responsibility is on the char-
terer. Usually bareboat chartering agreements refer to extended time periods.
* Strategic Petroleum Reserve : United States created in the middle 1970's a
huge reserve of 600 million barrels of oil, to be used to flood market with oil in an
event of "physical shortage" or to head off a major price spike.
* Deadfreight : refers to cargo-carrying capacity not used. Deadfreight is only
avoidable if oil supplies can be guaranteed and if the ships available conform (in
terms of draft) to the facilities at the load and discharge ports. In theory, oil supply
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reliability could be restored but the compatibility of ships and ports will only be
gradually improved as shallow draft ships replace deeper draft ships in the fleet and
as port facilities are improved. The larger deadfreight percentage has been observed
to the routes N.Europe-N.Europe and routes with discharge terminal in S.Europe,
specially those coming from N.Africa. This reflect the limitation in draft of ports in
those areas (specially in Italy)2 . Although deadfreight is a function of tanker's size,
the medium size tankers (90,000-175,000) have experienced the larger deadfreight
percentage among the tanker fleet as a whole.
2 See Appendices A and B.
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1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Koopmans
One of the first theories proposed to forecast tanker freight rates was introduced by Koop-
mans [1]. He used the traditional microeconomic theory, according to which the equilib-
rium point on supply - demand curves (point of intersection of these two curves) defines
the prevailing freight rate. Koopmans also investigated the interrelationship between the
dynamic behavior of the tanker market and tanker freight and shipyard's activity to ex-
plain the dynamic behavior of the tanker market.
Tanker demand was modeled as a market under pure competition conditions. Here
it should be noted that Koopmans observed the low elasticity of the demand (low corre-
lation between freight rates and demand for tanker transportation capacity). The above
conclusion was derived by two facts:
* Oil demand itself is price inelastic, at least in the short -run. The needed oil for
the industry section can not be substituted. Use of alternative fuel sources requires
high capital investment and introduces inactive time for the specific industry till the
modification will be over. Therefore oil consumption may be considered insensitive
towards oil prices.
* Freight rates constitute only a small portion of the final product price.Therefore big
oil companies generally do not consider the trends of freights but only their needs
when they schedule their tankship services.
Tanker supply was also modeled as a market under pure competition conditions with
the exception where the market is in a "boom" and freight rates are extremely high. In
such cases uncertainty drives freight rates up, diverging the market behavior from the
"perfect market model".
Koopmans, in his market model, distinguished two regions of different behavior of
elasticity of supply.
* When almost all the available world fleet is chartered and the rates are high, this
region shows small elasticity. More transportation capacity cannot be achieved from
newbuildings as it takes two years (on average) for a ship to be built and enter the
15
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Figure 1-1: Koopmans: Different Elasticity Regions
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market. Only a small amount of elasticity may be provided by increasing vessel
speed and decreasing port time, thus increasing transportation capacity.
* On the other side, when many vessels are idle (laid - up or unemployed) and freights
are low, tanker supply shows high elasticity. A slight increase in freight rates will
drive many ships to enter the market, thus providing a large increase of transporta-
tion capacity. -
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1.3.2 Zannetos
Another approach adopted by Zenon Zannetos was that tanker market contains itself
most of the information needed to predict future. Evaluating a methodology to forecast
long-term charter rates, he used as a basis for his model short-term charter rates at the
point of transaction. Before using short-term rates he divorced them from any short run
fluctuations that do not reflect basic structural relationships that are not valid over time
and may reflect market imperfections. Then he used correcting parameters to express
long term freight rates as a function of short term rates.
In all his studies both linear and exponential regression analysis were used. The general
form of relationships were:
RL = R, + a X + b *X 2 +c* X3 + d *X 4 +...
and
RL = R, * X * Xb * d * ...
A first approach was made in late 1950's [3]. Data covered the period between 1950
and 1957. As explanatory variables were used:
1. X1: The short term rate (a weighted average of spot rate on various routes weighted
on the basis of quantities of crude transported).
2. X2 : Duration of time charter in months.
3. X 3 : Lead time between agreement signature and delivery of the ship.
4. X4 : Size of the ship in DWT.
5. X 5 : Index of short term "adjustment".
6. X 6 : Vessels idle as a percentage of the working tanker fleet.
7. X7 : Index of change in X6 -
8. X 8 : Orders outstanding as a percentage of the working tanker fleet.
9. X9 : Index of change in new orders placed.
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In this first approach, exponential regression analysis gave better results. Data was
divided in two parts, reflecting periods of "high" and "low" market freight rates.
The second study on time charter rates covered the period between 1959 and 1966 [4].
It was similar to the first one apart from the fact that some new variables were included
and some old ones excluded. In more detail, the variables used were:
1. X1: Ship size in DWT.
2. X2 : Spot rate of the marginal vessel3 for the week of the signature of the Time
Chartering agreement.
3. X 3 : Duration of the time chartering.
4. X4 : Lead time between agreement signature and delivery of the ship.
A third model was proposed in [5], and evaluated by S. Polemis [6]. The explanating
factors in this work were:
The correcting parameters Xi represent:
* X1: the risk premium of underemployment, which we expect to change over time
due to technological changes.
* X 2 : The unemployment risk premium, which is a function of time. The longer the
duration of the time-charter, the greater the reduction of the risk of unemployment
facing the owner of a vessel. We conclude that X2 will have a minus sign in the
additive model and a value of less than one in the multiplicative one. Equivalent
risk premium does not exist in the short-term charter market.
X3 : Express the brokerage fee savings on the long - term rate. Brokerage fee
(usually 1.25% of the total rental involved) is payed by the vessel owner. The final
amount paid is proportional to the fee and to the number of brokers involved. With
the introduction of large tankers of 100,000 DWT and over and charter agreements
extending over 15 - 20 years, often special agreements are made with brokers and
the fee may be reduced to as low as 0.75 per cent.
3Marginal vessel is the smallest representative vessel in the spot market, serving on a particular route
and carrying crude.
19
* X4 stands for the mortgageability of the long term charters. The higher the rate
and the longer the duration of the charter, the greater the "mortgageability" of the
agreement and the owner of the vessel may achieve higher banking financing with
lower interest rates.
* X5 is the efficiency premium of the particular vessel. It takes into account the
different operating costs of vessels of different sizes and propulsion. It changes over
time, as new technologies are applied. It is actually the projected cost of fuel oil.
Obviously, the advantage of an efficient vessel is magnified as cost of fuel increases
and vice versa.
The conclusions Zannetos and Polemis reached were:
* The most determinant factor of freight rates is the size of the ship. The two variables
are negatively related, reflecting economies of scale.
* Spot rates do not influence long charter rates except in period of crisis. Time Charter
rates are defined from the cost of operation of the vessel, and it fluctuates close to
break-even rate. Fluctuations, although in the same direction of the spot rates in
the time of signature, have smaller amplitude.
* Time Charter rates and duration of charter are negatively correlated.
* There is a tendency of smaller period chartering during period of high spot rates.
* The portion of the world fleet that stays idle is negatively correlated with time-
charter and spot rates.
* Also, change of the world fleet that stays idle is negatively correlated with time-
charter and spot rates.
* The numbers of orders placed in shipyards for new vessels as well change on the
number of orders are positively correlated with time charter rates.
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1.3.3 Nersesian
Another methodology of forecasting tanker freight rates was presented in [7]. The method
is based on following the movement of the tanker fleet around the world and trying to
predict the decisions taken by shipowners at each point in time. It consists of a six layers
analysis. In more detail:
The first layer of analysis consists of projecting the total energy demand from the
main industrialized and oil-consuming countries (i.e. North America, Western Europe,
and Japan, countries of South America as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, South Africa and
the Asian countries of India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Hong Kong). Oil consumption is influenced by noneconomic factors, such as the weather
(a heavy winter will cause an increase of oil demand for heating) and government policy
such as the pricing of oil 4.
The second layer of analysis consists on predicting the portion of the energy
demand that will be covered by each fuel: oil, coal, natural gas, nuclear and hydro. For
such a prediction to be accurate, we should consider the policies each country adopts,
towards each fuel. For example, countries imposed a ceiling on the imports of crude oil
to protect their foreign exchange reserves. Producing countries imposed many times a
similar limit on exports to protect their reserves.
In particular, on what concerns the U.S.A. and the consumption of natural gas, the
following parameters should be considered:
* the future pricing policies of DOE,
* the effect of these policies on exploration budgets of oil and gas companies,
* the success of finding new gas fields for any given level for exploration activity, and
* the nature of DOE rulings on liquified natural gas (LNG) imports into the United
States.
In the same way, concerning coal we should consider:
* effects of legislation on strip mining
4In the early 70s the U.S.A. presented an increased energy consumption rate due to the pricing policy
of the U.S.A. government which kept prices of oil and natural gas lower than the international levels.
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a mine safety
* pollution standards on the production of coal
* the availability of capital and labor to develop and operate new mines.
Similar studies should cover all the countries that present high levels of energy con-
sumption. This is difficult, as trends sometimes change in an unexpected way. For exam-
ple, concerning nuclear energy, although it covered 10% - 15% of the total energy demand
in the U.S.A., by mid-1980s no serious change occurred since then. This is mainly due to
the public attitude towards nuclear stations and the old question of nuclear waste disposal.
On the other hand, construction of the natural gas pipeline which will supply Central and
Eastern Europe from Russia is scheduled to be completed by 1996.
The third layer of analysis concerns the definition of the portion of the crude oil
that will be imported through sea routes. Concerning Japan such a task is easy as it is an
inland state, with no domestic production, therefore it must cover all its needs through
shipping. Europe and U.S.A. on the other hand, although they are importing crude oil
to cover their needs, have their own production as well (Oilfields at the North Sea for
Europe, Alaska and Texas for the U.S.A.). The portion of the crude that finally will be
imported is defined by the following factors:
* Existence of pipelines that supply crude oil from neighbouring countries. An example
is the supply of Western Europe with crude oil from Russia.
* Domestic production, mainly influenced by goverment's policy for exploitation of
the domestic oilfields. Concerning the U.S.A., offshore exploration activity is con-
strained by the timing of lease sales conducted by the Department of Interior and
by the public's opposition to drilling off beaches. Domestic production, is also in-
fluenced by the oil price policy of governments. For example, in 1979, the U.S.A.
government decided to keep the price of domestic oil at $6 while OPEC's oil price
in the market was $30 .
Transportation demand is not defined only by the amount of crude oil that should be
carried but by the distance between producing and consuming countries as well.
Having defined the quantities needed for import, we have to define the quantities that
are going to be exported from each oil-producing country. The exported crude oil may be
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defined as the oil-production of the country minus its domestic consumption. Projections
on the exports of oil-producing countries over a period of time should be made. The
main oil-producing countries are Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, the Soviet
Union, Mexico and Mainland China and those of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Oman). Finally, having clarified who supplies
whom we have completed the fourth layer of our analysis.
The fifth layer of our analysis, which estimates the total transportation demand
is not a simple calculation (i.e. just the multiplication of cargo by the distance between
exporting - importing countries) as for the same port of destination and the same port of
call different routes may be used. For example, if a cargo has to be moved from Kirkuk
oilfield (Iraq) to Genoa (Italy) the different routes from which we have to choose are:
1. From Kirkuk to Basrah through pipeline and then to Genoa via Cape of Good Hope.
2. From Kirkuk to Basrah through pipeline and then to Genoa via Suez Canal. In
this case the pipelines Sumed (connecting the two sides of Suez Canal) or the Trans
-Israel pipeline (connecting terminals in Red Sea with terminals in Mediterranean )
may be used.
3. From Kirkuk to Dortyol (Turkey) through pipeline and then to Genoa.
4. From Kirkuk to Banias (Syria) through pipeline and then to Genoa .
5. From Kirkuk to Tripoli (Lebanon) through pipeline and then to Genoa.
These routes range from 1,500 n.miles (option 5 ) to 11,000 n.miles (option 1). There-
fore transportation demand is affected by the rate of utilization of pipelines and Suez
Canal, which are influenced from the existing spot rates in the market and the tolls for
usage of pipelines and Canals. For example, the opening of Suez Canal in 1975 did not
influence the spot rates as the tanker market was depressed and for an European importer
it would cost more to pay the tolls of Suez Canal than to go around the Cape of Good
Hope. Therefore, tolls are influenced from spot rates (and vice versa as the rate of their
utilization affects demanded transportation capacity, therefore the freight rates.).
To overcome this difficulty of interdependence between the tolls and future spot rates,
we may assume a high rate of utilization of Suez Canal and of pipelines. This is true most
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of the times, specially when freight rates are high, a period in which shipowners are more
interested in predicting future spot rates.
Of course political factors - unpredictable most of the time - may affect the demand
of transportation capacity. The closing of Suez Canal in 1967 as well as its reopening in
1975, the shut down of the pipeline supplying Iraqi oil in Haifa, Israel in 1948 from the
Iraq Petroleum Company and the IPC pipeline serving Lebanon due to the Libanese civil
war in 1982, all were political disputes.
Finally, the sixth layer of analysis consists of estimating the future demand for
each size of ship. All the ships are not the same. The main difference from the point of
view of the charterer is its cargo carrying capacity and its limitations (due to draft) of
accessing different ports. Having in mind that an oil importer in Philadelphia (U.S.A.)
who wants to import oil from the Persian Gulf, has the following options:
1. Moving the oil with 70,000 dwt tankers (Sumax) through Suez Canal.
2. Moving the oil with 100,000 dwt tankers via the Cape of Good Hope in the laden
portion of the trip. When the vessel returns, it may go through Suez Canal. At the
port of call, it will deliver some of its cargo to barges before entering the Delaware
Bay (due to draft limitations).
3. Using VLCCs or ULCCs via the Cape of Good Hope. When reaching the port, a
Single Point Mooring system may be used to unload their cargo. Another option for
unloading the cargo will be to use shuttle tankers.
4. Using VLCCs which will be unload their cargo at the Sumed pipeline(running par-
allel to the Suez Canal). Tankers 70,000 dwt be loaded and they will continue the
trip.
5. Finally, another option for unloading the cargo of VLCCs and ULCCs would be the
LOOP.
From the above we conclude that, in order to complete this step we should not only look
on the various routes the vessel may follow, but other means of crude oil transportation for
certain parts of the trip. Economies of scale for VLCCCs and ULCCs should be considered
as well as their problems of accessibility in harbors with draft limitations. We always have
to be informed about undertaken programs for harbor deepening, as well installation of
24
other loading/unloading facilities such as SPM (Single Point Mooring) or Offshore Oil
Pipeline (as the Louisianna L.O.O.P.).
SPMs are installed at ports that present deep sea depth close to shore. Their low
installation cost in combination with gains coming from the use of larger vessels, made
these facilities the main aspect of port development in the 70s. Their effect was that trade
routes that were served from smaller tankers were opened to VLCCs and ULCCs.
Finally another characteristic of the ports that should be considered is the future of
the refineries that they supply. U.S.A. refineries are fitted for the treatment of domestic
sweet crudes. In the contrary, most European distilleries are fitted for the treatment of
the Middle East sour crudes. Therefore we may expect that the sweet crude of the North
Sea will be shipped in the U.S.A. to be refined.
Having projected tanker demand for different groups of vessel sizes, the next step will
be to project tanker availability. The existing world fleet should be adjusted for new and
delayed deliveries, cancellations of orders, losses at sea and scrappage. Scrappage is a
function of many factors, the main one being the projected freight rates. Finally, having
the projected tanker supply and demand per size category, we may estimate the expected
freight rate.
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1.4 Mathematical Tool (Regression Analysis).
In many economic, engineering and science problems, where we have to explain or predict
a result, the first step would be to determine the effect of different parameters on this
single result. Linear regression theory, is a well developed tool for this task and may
constitute a first approach to the problem . If one has reason to think that the nature of
the problem is non-linear or that assumptions about linearity are violated, further analysis
would be needed, i.e. non-linear analysis.
As the variable to be explained in linear regression depends on the value of a set of
parameters, it is called dependent variable, and the input parameters (Xo, X1, X2, ..., Xr)
are called independent or explanatory variables. In many cases, where we can use linear
regression, the relation between the dependent variable with the independent ones is linear
i.e. it has the form:
Y = /30 + 1 * X + ... + 3r * X
Where 0o, i, 32, --- are constants that have to be determined. Therefore, if we can
estimate these coefficients we will be able to know the results for each group of input.
Many times measurements are not very accurate. Therefore what we should expect is
Y = 3o + 31 *X1 + ... + 3 * X + E
where E is the error. The error has a mean equal to zero.
So, the problem is how to estimate the coefficients 30, f81, ... + ,3r given a sample of n
values of each of the variables Y, X1, X 2, ..., X, so that will give us the "best estimate". The
analysis of the data is called regression analysis, the equation linear regression equation
(simple for one independent variable, multiple for more) and the coefficients are called the
regression coefficients.
Putting the equations into matrix form, we have the following expression:
Y = X *, + E
Where Y is the column vector of the n values of y, f the column vector of unknown
coefficients, X the (n,p) matrix which columns show the n-values of an input parameter
for the period from where the data was acquired, and by E the column vector of errors.
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To have the "best estimate" we have to find the group of coefficients that minimize
the error. Assuming that we know the coefficients, the sum of square of errors from each
measurement should be minimal. Therefore
E (Ymeas - Yestim)2 minimum.
or:
S(Ymea, - o -/31 * X1 - 2 * X2- -k * Xk) 2 minimum
So, to have the least square estimator b of /3, we use the following formula,:
b = (X' X) - 1 * X' * y
INDEX OF FIT
The value of
R %= l(Xi- X) * (Y - Y)
is called coefficient of correlation. In the above formula, X are the values of the single
explanatory variable X and mx,my are the sample means of X and Y. The coefficient
of correlation takes values from the space between -1 and 1 , and it may be positive or
negative, depending on the sample covariation of of the X and Y.
Another useful quantity is the square of the coefficient of correlation which is called
coefficient of determination.
For a multiple linear regression, i.e. a regression with more than one explanatory
variables, the coefficient of determination (or R-squared) is generally defined as the ratio
of the explained sum of squares over the total sum of squares. The total sum of squares
is .(Y - Y) , which is a measure of the total sample variation of the dependent vari-
able. Recall that we are estimating y by Xb, where b are the least-squares estimate of
/3. Therefore, the part of the total variation which is explained by the regression (i.e.
the explained sum of squares) is given by the same formula as the total sum of squares
but with the i-th component of Xb in the place of Y. A perfect linear regression would
explain all the sample variation of the dependent variable, resulting in a coefficient of
determination equal to 1. Generally, R-squared takes values between zero and one, and
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it expresses the percentage of the total variation in Y explained by the regression model.
The coefficient of determination is a useful tool for comparing regression models, but it
has a major shortcoming: it is a non-decreasing function of the number of explanatory
variables presented in the model. This means that , if we add any variable to a model,
the coefficient of determination almost invariably increases and never decreases. In view
of this, R-squared is inappropriate for comparing regression models with the same depen-
dent variable but different numbers of explanatory variables. In order to deal with this
difficulty, one defines the adjusted R-squared, R2 , in the following way:
R2 = 1 -(1 - R2 ) * N-p
The adjusted R-squared is appropriate for comparing regression models with different
numbers of explanatory variables. In contrast with R-squared, the adjusted R-squared
can be negative, in which case it is considered to be zero.
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Chapter 2
Model Development
2.1 Introduction.
The purpose of this model is to forecast spot rates in the crude oil market. Spot freight
rates will be assumed as an expression of the idle portion of the fleet, as well as of the
size of the ship.
As mentioned, freight rates for the same time moment and for the same route differ
according to the size of the ship 1. Therefore the tanker fleet is going to be divided in
four groups, based on the ship sizes. Each size group shows a different relation between
inactivity and freight rates. The four groups are:
1. Small vessels (40,000 - 70,000 DWT)
2. Medium size vessels (70,000 - 100,000 DWT)
3. Capesize size vessels (100,000 - 160,000 DWT)
4. Large size vessels (200,000 - 300,000 DWT)
The idle portion of the fleet may be defined - for each size group - as the ratio of the
idle fleet capacity (available minus demanded) over the available capacity.
In our investigation, we will attempt to express the demanded transportation
capacity as a function of the industrial production of the heavy industrialized countries.
Apart from industrial demand for oil, household consumption (heating, transportation) is
1There are other factors that make freight rates differ. These are going to be discussed later.
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considered. If this is the case, it will show a dependence on the welfare of people which
may be expressed as the Gross Domestic Product (per capita) of the country. Therefore,
GDP will be tested as an explanatory variable.
Future ship availability may be estimated on the basis of the erosion of the existing
tanker fleet through scrappage, and the addition of newbuildings currently on order .
Issues such as employment of the combined cargo fleet in dry cargo trades, hidden in-
activity (slow steaming) or inactivity for other reasons (maintenances/inspections, repairs
- dry docking,deadfreight, excess port time) have not been considered.
Idleness in our investigation includes all tankers which have not moved for two months
or more and all tankers reported to be laid up. Scrappage rate will be given as a function
of today's market condition and the portion of the fleet which is "old" . The critical age
after which a ship is considered "old" will also be investigated.
Finally, freight rates will be defined as an expression of the estimated portion of the
fleet (per group of tanker size) in idleness.
In our model, the spot market will be assumed as ideal, perfectly competitive. The
reasons that drive us to this conclusion are the following:
* New competitors may enter the market whenever they wish. No restrictions exist.
* The large number of the owners that decline to join or form a consortium. Although
some attempts have been made either towards a common policy or control of the
market by individuals, the shipowners remain strongly competitive against each
other. The most serious attempt for dominance over the tanker market has been
made in 1973 by shipowner Ar.Onnassis . Although he managed to control a large
portion of the world tanker fleet at one moment, he had to abandon his plans under
the pressure of the boycott the large oil companies exercised on his vessels.
* Large oil companies own only a small portion of the world tanker fleet, therefore
they can not affect freights. On the contrary, they take part in competing, acting
as individuals, chartering to competing oil companies their tankers if they are idle .
* In industry, the state may "protect" it from foreign competition or burden it with
heavy taxation, thus producing "inefficiencies" in the perfect market concept. This is
not true for the shipping market, ships are able to change flag at any time. Shipown-
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ers have to comply with regulations only when these are adopted by international
institutions 2. Ttherefore the concept of the perfect competition still holds.
* New shipowners have no restrictions to affront whenever they wish to enter the
tanker market. For a newcomer, financing is available to him as well3. Also, al-
though economies of size exist, some routes are not available to large vessels due to
navigational restrictions (limited draft ports). Finally, a large administrative struc-
ture is not necessary as in each port independent brokers are available to supply the
ship with fuel, water , food, and engine spare parts, if needed.
Also, another assumption is that demand for tankers is not affected by ship's freights.
This may be justified by the following:
* The cost of oil transportation is a minor portion of the total production cost of oil
and its products.
* Oil industries cannot change to other fuels easily nor they can reduce their outputs.
Therefore their needs are price inelastic. In the long run, if high oil prices persist,
the factories will move to other sources of energy, reducing the demand in oil. From
history, persisting high oil prices were never a result of excess transportation demand
(and high tanker freights), but was a result of oil-producing countries 4 policy.
* In a large extent, no substitution of the ocean transportation exists. Of course, the
cargo owner may prefer to use oil pipelines and/or Suez-Panama Canal to shorten
the length of the voyage in periods where high rates prevail in the tanker market.
But we have to keep in mind that tolls of Canals crossing and payments for use of
oil pipelines fluctuate in parallel with tanker freights.
2Exception to this is ships under "Jones Act" and the drive of double-hull concept the U.S.A. imposed
on the new orders.
3Financing as high as 80% have been reported in periods of high tanker rates. After a period of 6 - 7
years, when the loan will have been repaid, shipowner may expect a satisfactory return on his investment.
4Therefore, against the common perception, persisting high oil prices is not on the interest of oil-
producing countries as part of the industry will move to other energy sources. The portion of the market
lost is very difficult - if not impossible - to be regained.
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2.2 Tanker Demand.
2.2.1 Qualitative Analysis.
The need for oil transportation is a function of the industrialized countries' oil consump-
tion, the regional availability of oil (reserves, policy of country and price, oil-pumping
capability), and the development of new transportation systems (mainly pipelines - oil
and natural gas).
Oil consumption is proportional to the industrial production of each country. Other
energy sources may be used (nuclear, solar, aeolic, hydraulic,natural gas) and that was
the trend after the oil crisis of 1973 - 74. But soon after they were abandoned due to
the lack of natural resources in sufficient level (hydraulic,solar), waste treatment problems
and high associated risks (nuclear) and energy storage problems (aeolic). Although the
feasibility of the above means to explore natural resources existing, the related costs (per
kWh of energy produced) are much higher than if oil-driven power stations were used.
Finally, natural gas was found in small quantities far from the main consuming ar-
eas. At this moment, due to political instability and internal conflicts, Algeria, the main
supplier of natural gas in Europe has almost stopped providing it. Also, due to the con-
frontation of the two super-powers, the natural gas pipeline that would supply Western
Europe from the Russian reserves was not materialized. In the early 90's, when political
disputes eased, the construction of the pipeline began and is expected to be completed by
the end of 1996. However, no large amounts of natural gas are used as an alternative fuel
for power stations.
As oil remains the main driving power behind power stations, it is expected that the
industrial production of Japan, U.S.A. and Western Europe affect the tanker's demand
for oil transportation. It should be noted that:
* Japan heavily depends to oil imports. There is no domestic production as in main-
land U.S.A. (Texas), or Europe (North Sea oilfields)
* Japan is an island state and all its oil imports should be made through sea routes
(no pipelines),
* Finally Japan is farther away from all main oil producing areas (Indonesia, Middle
East) than U.S.A. (Gulf of Mexico, Alaska) and Europe (Azerbaitzan,Libya, Coast
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of Ivory, Middle East). An exception is the oil producing area of Alaska. It should
be noted that it would be in the interest of both countries - Japan as well as U.S.A.
- if Japan imported oil from Alaska. At the same time, U.S.A. would import more
oil from the Carribean (and less from Alaska) thus not having to send tankers from
Alaska all the way around through Panama Canal (or even Maggelan Straits for
larger tankers) to supply the United States East Side.
We conclude that all countries do not affect demand for oil transportation through sea
ways proportionally to their industrial production. Japan affects to a greater extent the
demanded capacity than the other industrialized countries.
Another factor that we should look at is how each size group is affected by a change in
the industrial production of a country. Japan with its deep ports and extended unloading
facilities is expected to affect the larger size groups.
Smaller size groups should be affected by oil demand of countries that do not have
deep ports. There are few ports in the world in which a ULCC may come in fully loaded.
The usual procedure is that a ULCC will unload part or all of its cargo to smaller tankers
when it reaches the vicinity of the arrival port. Therefore, as all countries use smaller
tankers it is expected that demand for small size tankers will be proportional to the oil
needs of the country (and consequently with its industrial production).
During the last ten years another change occurred in the tanker market. Main oil
trade routes do not connect anymore just oil producing to consuming areas. Discharging
zones must be regarded as well as countries with large oil refining capacity such as those
in Southeast Asia.
2.2.2 Quantitative Analysis.
In the following analysis the relation between the demand for each of the four main
size tanker groups and the industrial production of the most industrialized countries is
investigated. The Industrial Productions of U.S.A., Japan and O.E.C.D. were used as
explanatory variables.
One might expect that the consumption of oil from households also affects the need
for oil transportation. Also it may be assumed that the household oil consumption is
proportional to the country's Gross Domestic Product (actually to the Gross Domestic
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Product per capita). Gross Domestic Product includes industrial production, agriculture
and services5 . So, the G.D.P. of U.S.A. , Japan and of two typical Europen countries -
United Kingdom and France - were investigated as explanatory variables.
For medium size tankers (70,00 - 100,000 DWT) and for large size ones (200,000 -
300,000 DWT), the data included in our analysis covers a period of 120 months: from
Jan 1983 to Dec. 1992. For small size tankers (size of ships : 40,000 - 70,000 DWT) and
for capesize ones (100,000 - 160,000 DWT) the data covers a period of 52 months (Jan 85
- Jul. 90).
As far as it concerns the latter two size groups (size of ships : 40,000 - 70,000 DWT
and 100,000 - 160,000 DWT) the reason for using less data was the following: although
from a mathematical point of view a high degree of explanatory power was achieved
(Radj=0.7194) it gave poor results in the validation test (comparison between the actual
demand and the forecasted one for the period Jan. 1993 - Dec.1993). An explanation
to this discrepancy, may be that data taken when market was in recession (Jan 1983 -
Dec. 1985) as well as data corresponding to a high unstable market due to uncertainty
(Kuwait War :Aug 1990. till the and of our data series.) should be excluded . The period
of recession is clearly shown in Fig. 1, where the drop of total available capacity while
demanded capacity remains constant may be clearly seen. After this assumption had
been taken into consideration and the data from the above time intervals was excluded,
the resulted formula was validated achieving both a high degree of explanatory power for
past results and a good agreement between forecasted and future 6 demand.
In more detail the results were the following:
1. Size Group : 40,000 - 70,000 DWT
D = 155.2477 - 2.3049 * X + (1.1616/117.22) * X2
Rj = 0.8180
Where:
D1: Demand for oil transportation [ million DWT]
X : Industrial Production of O.E.C.D. [100: 1980]
As it was expected for small tankers, the industrial production of all the industrial-
5For the U.S.A. the structure of G.D.P. is 10% agriculture, 20% industrial production and 70% services.
6 "Future" in comparison to our data bank
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ized countries affected their demand.
2. Size Group 70,000- 100,000
D2 = 134.0227 + 0.4117 * Y - 2.2628 * Z + (1.1616/130.902) * 2
Rd = 0.8366
Where:
D2 : Demand for oil transportation [million DWT]
Y: Industrial Production of U.S.A. [100: 1980]
Z: Industrial Production of Japan [100 :1980]
Note: A fluctuation in the Industrial Production of the U.S.A. and Japan will be
reflected to the market (proportional fluctuation in tanker's demand) two months
afterwards.
3. Size Group 100,000 - 160,000 DWT
D3 = 240.9027-1.9133*Y+(0.9099/120.9487) *Y2-1.6234*Z+(0.8433/130.902)*Z 2
Rad = 0.6971
adj
D3 : Demand for oil transportation [million DWT]
Y: Industrial Production of U.S.A. [100: 1980]
Z: Industrial Production of Japan [100: 1980]
Note: A fluctuation in the Industrial Production of the U.S.A. and Japan will be
reflected to the market (proportional fluctuation in the tanker's demand) one month
afterwards.
4. Size Group 200,000 - 300,000 DWT
D4 = 3964 + 0.4354 * Y3 - 10.6691 * Z + (5.1504/130.902) * Z2
adj = 0.7838
D4 : Demand for oil transportation [million DWT]
Y: Industrial Production of U.S.A. [100: 1980]
Z: Industrial Production of Japan [100: 1980]
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No correlation was found between the G.D.P. of U.S.A., Japan France and United
Kingdom and the demanded oil transportation capacity, when industrial production
was also used as an explanatory parameter. This merely shows that there is no
relation between G.D.P. and tanker demand. On the contrary, it invokes the high
degree of correlation between Industrial Production and G.D.P.
After having analyzed the demanded capacity in an explanatory point of view, a
validation test was conducted - as it was mentioned above - comparing the data
predicted by our model with the actual ones. Figures 2.3,2.4,2.5 and 2.6 show the
good agreement between the results from our model and the actual values for each
size group.
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Ship Size: 40,000 - 70,000 DWT
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140
Figure 2-1: Defining Recession Period
2.2.3 Conclusions.
From the above analysis the following conclusions were reached:
* The demand for small size ships (40,000 - 70,000 DWT) is proportional to the
industrial production of the O.E.C.D.
* The demand for medium ship sizes (70,000 - 100,000 DWT), are proportional to the
Industrial Production of U.S.A and Japan. It was also noticed that an increase in
industrial production of the above two countries will be reflected to tanker's market
two months afterwards.
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Figure 2-2: Defining recession Period
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Figure 2-3: Demand Forecasting Validation
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* Demand for Capesize tankers (100,000 -160,000 DWT) is influenced by the Industrial
Production of the U.S.A. and - to a smaller extent - by the Industrial Production of
Japan. A fluctuation in Industrial Production of these two countries will be reflected
to tanker's market one month afterwards.
* Demand for large tankers (200,00 - 300,000 DWT) is proportional to the Industrial
Production of both the U.S.A. and Japan.
* The formulas derived cannot describe the demand for small size tankers (40,000
-70,000 DWT) and medium size tankers (100,000 - 160,000) during periods of reces-
sion or periods with high uncertainty (wars,political instabilities) on the future oil
prices.
* Formulas that predict demand for medium (70,000 -100,00 DWT) and large size
vessels (200,000 -300,000 DWT) are valid for all market conditions: market in
recession, market in equilibrium or market characterized by excessive demand due
to uncertainty for future prices.
* G.D.P. offers no more explanatory power than the industrial production, as these
two parameters are highly dependent between on other.
* There is good agreement both in explaining and in predicting analysis of the de-
manded capacity as a function of the industrial production of the most industrialized
countries in the world.
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2.3 Tanker Availability.
2.3.1 Qualitative Analysis.
By the term tanker availability we refer to the total capacity that may serve on the
transportation of crude oil. The simplistic approach that tanker availability is equal to
the total fleet capacity is going to be assumed. The total fleet capacity does not correspond
to the available capacity exactly. Ships dry-docking for surveys and repairs should not be
included in the available capacity. Also, as we refer to spot rates of crude oil cargo ships,
we should exclude ships that are used to transport "clean" cargo (i.e. refined oil products)
as well as ships that are long-term chartered. Finally we should include combined cargo
vessels (Ore/Bulk/Oil) that they may be operate in the oil market or in the dry bulk
market, depending on the rates of the two markets.
It should be noted that it is a rare phenomenon to see a shipowner to transfer a
specialized ship ("combined" cargo or "clean" cargo) from the dry bulk market or from
"clean" oil market to the crude oil market, as this invokes an additional expense to the him
(cleaning of the store areas, "idle" time to transfer the vessel from one region to another).
Also, considering the small amount of capacity that is out of market dry-docking we may
assume that it may be neglected.
Another argument supporting the hypothesis that we may omit dry-docked capacity
is the following. When freight rates are low, shipowners are not reluctant to finish any
repairs thus we may see the dry-docking capacity increasing. Also, when freight rates are
low, the idle capacity of the fleet increases. Therefore dry-docking capacity is dependent
on the freight rates. As in our model freight rates will be expressed as a function of the
idle portion of the fleet7, we are justified not to use the dry-docked capacity as a separate
variable for calculating the available capacity of the fleet (and from there the idle capacity)
, as both variables (available and dry-docked) are dependent on the prevailing tanker rates
of the market.
Feature available capacity may be found by adding newbuildings and subtracting ships
that went for scrap.
As it takes two years on average for a ship to be build, newbuildings may be assumed
7The idle portion of the fleet is the ratio of the idle capacity (available minus demanded) over the
available capacity.
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known for a period of two years.
Predicting the capacity of scrapped ships is much more complex. As ship's age in-
creases the same happens with its operation costs (in comparison with newbuildings that
use more automated systems, and more fuel-efficient engines ), its insurance cost and its
repair and maintenance costs. There is not a critical age for ships after which they may
considered "old" after which possibilities for scraping rise enormously. In general, few
ships will be scrapped before the age of ten years. Thereafter the rate will accelerate
with age, and the critical period is often at special survey times (every 4/5 years - with
extension may be reach 6) when the cost of maintaining a ship to classification society
standards is often prohibitive in view of its remaining trading life.
Other reasons that may affect the scrap rate of ships are:
1. Regulations: The ratified IMO safety and anti-pollution regulations and the ships
standards mandated by certain nations (e.g. the United States Port and tanker
Safety Act) require vessels carrying oil to have certain equipment on board such as
Inert Gas Systems (IGS), Crude Oil Washing (COW) and Segregated or Dedicated
Clean Ballast Tanks (SBT/CBT). Ships without equipment are liable to suffer a
high rate of scrappage.
2. Market Conditions: Historical evidence indicates that rates of scrappage are high
when tanker freight rates are low. Conversely when the freight market is buoyant,
scrappage diminishes.
3. Scrap prices: High scrap prices can at times attract more ships to the breakers'
yards. Ship scrap prices are to a certain extent, however, governed by prices for
other forms of ferrous waste and by the value of the end product, i.e. melting scrap,
or re-rolled material. In general, fluctuations in vessel scrap prices will have a minor
influence on the amount of tonnage sold for breaking.
Also it should be noted that due to their poor economic performance, steam turbine
ships will tend to suffer a higher rate of scrapping than marine diesel units.
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2.3.2 Quantitative Analysis.
In the following analysis the relation between the market conditions (high or low freight
rates) and the tonnage leaving the market for scrap is going to be investigated. Also
the relation - if any - between the "aged fleet" and the scrapped capacity is going to be
determined.
The following procedure was used: For every size group the relation between the
freights and the scrapped tonnage was found (see figures 2.7,2.8,2.9 and 2.10 for scrap
rate). Also the "age" over which a ship may be considered old was assumed and different
values of this age were investigated for all the four size groups. The aged capacity had to
be calculated for each month and for each size group each time the "threshold" age was
changed (see Figures 2.11 and 2.12 for the age profile of two Ship Size Groups : 70,000 -
100,000 and 100,000 - 160,000 dwt, for the period Jan. 1983 - Dec 1992).
Size Group 40,000 - 70,000 dwt:
S1 = 1.4120 * 10-2 - 17.83 * *10-5 * WS 1 + 56.2987 * 10-7WS12
Radj = 0.6980
Considering the "aged" fleet did not give a better fit.
Size group 70,000 - 100,000 dwt:
Considering the "aged" fleet, the following results were derived: age: 17
S2 = 7.2166 * 10-2 - 1.5024 * WS 2 * 10- 4 + 64.5 * WS2 * 10- 7 + 0.6372 * OC2 * 10-8
Radj = 0.6973
Where "oc" is the capacity of this size group if we consider only ships 17 years old or
older. Different ages were investigated but they showed worse results.
If we do not consider the "aged" fleet, the results are the following:
S2 = 8.0627 * 10-2 - 1.2760 * WS2 * 10- 4 53.4433 * WS2 * 10- 8
Radj = 0.6436
As we can see the explanatory power of the "aged" capacity is small.
Size Group: 100,000 - 160,000 dwt:
No correlation was found between the scrapped capacity of this size group and the
freight rates. On the contrary, if "aged" fleet is considered the capacity of this size group
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of ships that are 13 years old and older, the following result is achieved:
S3 = 2.8251 - 5.3743 * WS 3 * 10- 5 + 1.4512 * OC3 * 10-8
Radj = 0.4528
The above results should be used with great care because of the low degree of corre-
lation and because of the period from where the associated data were derived. The early
and mid-80's where characterized by a surplus in this tonnage built-up in 1974-76 and
many ships went for scrap although they were regarded as new.
Size Group 200,000- 300,000 dwt:
For this size group both freight rates and "aged" capacity affect the scrapping rate.
It was found that we have to consider ships 14 years old and older in our analysis. The
following numerical results were achieved:
S4 = 8.1709 * 10- 3 - 2.9727 * WS4 * 10- 5 - 0.6034 * OC4 * 10-8
Ra4d = 0.6636
Omiting the "aged" fleet as an explanatory variable, the following results were derived;
S4 = 15.1690 * 10 - 3 - 45.7189 * WS 4 * 10- 5 + 352.9177 * WS42 * 10-8
Radj = 0.5072
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Size Group: 40,000 - 70,000
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Time: 1983 - 1992
Figure 2-7: Percentage of Size Group Capacity Scrapped
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Figure 2-10: Percentage of Size Group Capacity Scrapped
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Figure 2-12: Capacity of "aged" fleet
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2.4 Freights
2.4.1 Qualitative Analysis.
Regarding ships of same size, freights, behave in a similar way -more or less- for differ-
ent routes (in WS terms). In long term they follow the same trend. Factors that may
differentiate freights are:
1. Ports with limited draught. Thus, on large tonnage ships (medium tankers, ULCC's
and VLCC's), competition is restricted between ships designed with smaller draught
than the optimum one (for fuel efficiency). Of course other techniques may be used
such as ships to dock at restricted draft terminals; they often either have to part-
load or lighten before entering (lightering). Offshore pipelines running miles away
from coast may be used as well (such as LOOP - Louisianna offshore oil pipeline,
or mother ship may unload to smaller ships.).
2. In short term, freights may change substantially, as what defines freight rates is the
number of tankers available in the proximity of the region of interest (oil producing
country). Thus, an otherwise inexplicable jump or drop may be present in freights
for this route. As it take less than a month to cover a local surplus in tanker demand
by moving in tankers from other markets, the jump in freights will not be seen for
a period more than a month (at most two). The same can not be said for markets
with surplus in supply (large availability in tonnage). Shipowners are willing to wait
for "better days" (higher transportation capacity demand) or to see someone else
taking the burden of moving from one market to another.
3. For small and medium size tankers, it may be observed that freights do not present
so many ups and downs as for VLCC's and ULCC's. This may be due to the
influence of combined cargo tankers. Combined cargo tankers are willing to leave
the oil market and jump into the dry bulk market if they see a low rate of freights
in the tanker market (and vice versa). So, the portion of idleness will drop, driving
freights up (or down, in a reverse situation). This "stability factor" does not affect
the market of ULCC's and VLCC's as there are not any combined tankers with such
a large size. The flexibility of supply offered by combined carriers can be gauged by
the fact that, at the peak of the market in 1973, these ships added almost 50% to
54
Effect of Ship Size in Freights
20 40 60 80 100 120
Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-13:
tanker supply, but in 1981 they added only 10% [1].
4. In addition the ship's draft another parameter that may exclude some ships from
being part of competition in certain routes is ship's breadth. Such a characteristic
route is Alaska-U.S.E.S. Tanker designs away from the optimum (fuel consumption
for given transportation capacity) are very common at the area of 70,000 DWT
(PANAMAX), so that they are able to travel via Panama Canal.
5. As it is expected, the larger the size of ship, the lower its freight (in W.S.) due to
scale economies (see Figure 2.13 for the effect of ship size in freight rates).
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6. During recessionary periods , shipowners are ready to accept lower rates for longer
voyages. This is due to the fact that they avoid risk of unemployment - which is very
high during recessionary periods - for longer time. The adverse phenomenon should
be expected when demand for transportation capacity increases. Also shipowners
are willing to accept lower freight rates when the port of call is close to a region with
high chartering activity. This is true specially during recession periods (see Figures
2.15 and 2.16).
7. Also we have to consider the effect of idleness of larger and/or smaller tanker ships
on the category of ships (according to its DWT) under investigation.
8. Other restrictions may apply in certain routes. For example only U.S. flag ships
( ships operating under the "Jones Act" to be more specific) may serve the route
Alaska - U.S.W.S. or U.S.E.S.
9. Competition from other sizes: according to a Drewery's report [1], medium-sized
tankers (80,000 - 140,000 DWT) compete with ships smaller than themselves on
virtually all routes, but there are a few important trades where the competition is
of particular importance. These are noted in the following table:
TRADE 1983 EMPLOYMENT COMPETING SHIP
OF MEDIUM TANKERS SIZE
( million DWT )
North-Europe-North Europe 2.4 Smaller
North Africa-South Europe 2.0 Smaller
Carribean-USES 1.2 Smaller
East Med. -South Europe 1.8 Smaller
A.G.-South Europe (C/C) 0.3 VLCC
Carribean-North Europe 0.6 Smaller
North Africa-USES 0.3 Smaller
E.Europe-South Europe 1.0 Smaller
Alaska-USWC 0.7 VLCC
Alaska - Panama pipeline 0.6 VLCC
North Europe - USES 0.8 Smaller
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Freights in Routes Med - NWE, MED - MED
20 40 60 80 100 120
Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-14: Different freight rates during recession.
Competition on these trades will be in the form on new fuel-economy 60 and 80,000-
tonners and from surplus VLCC's.
In Figures 2.18 - 2.22 we can see trade routes for which freight rates behave the same.
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURE
In the third part of our analysis, we have tried to forecast freight rates when idleness
of the fleet is assumed given. Fleet was divided in four size groups, same as in the previous
steps of our analysis:
1. 40,000 - 70,000 dwt
2. 70,000 - 100,000 dwt
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Freights in Routes NWE - Car, Med - Med
20 40 60 80 100 120
Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-15: Different freight rates during recession.
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Freights in Routes Med - NWE, MED - MED
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Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-16: Freight Rates show agreement
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Freights in Routes Car - USES, ECM - USES
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Figure 2-17: Freight Rates show agreement
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Figure 2-18: Freight Rates show agreement
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Freights in Routes AG - East, MED - MED
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Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-19: Freight Rates show agreement
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Freights in Routes RS - Eur, Med - Med
20 40 60 80 100 120
Time: Jan 1983 - Jun 1993 [months]
Figure 2-20: Freight Rates show agreement
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Freights in Routes RS - Eur, Med - Med
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Figure 2-21: Freight Rates show agreement
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3. 100,000 - 160,000 dwt
4. 200,000 - 300,000 dwt
The derived data covers a period of 10.5 years (126 months) from January 1983 till
June 1993.
In our investigation we examined the influence of the idleness of a group on the freights
prevailing in the same ship size group. Also we examined the impact on freight rates of
one group due to the idleness of other ship size groups. In most cases such a relation was
observed, and in some cases such an influence was even higher than the impact on freights
due to idleness of the same size group.
Finally we examined the time - series for existence of time-lag. We compared freight
rates with idleness shifting idleness values one,two and three months in both directions
(towards the future and towards the past). Although in most of the cases such a time
lag seemed to exist, if each route was treated as an individual case, no main pattern that
could characterize all trade routes seemed to exist.
In Figures 2.22 and 2.23, we may notice two idleness thressholds which are related
with oversupply and overdemand.
On what it concerns oversupply, by the term Idleness Threshold we mean the idleness
percentage of the fleet, above which freight rates reach a lower limit shipowners will accept,
thus being insensitive to inactivity levels. This lower limit in freight rates is defined as
operating cost minus lay-up cost.
On what it concerns overdemand, by the term Idleness Threshold, we mean the idleness
percentage below which no relation between supply and demand exists as "panic buying"
prevails. Shipowners may ask whatever freight rates they wish and charterers have no
other choice than to accept, as the belief is that tomorrow freight rates will inrease even
more.
For each size group neither the idleness thresholds nor freight rates (in WS) are the
same. Plotting freights rates versus idleness (as in Figures 2.23 and 2.24) we may form
the following table:
65
Route 08
I I
....... ..- .:.. - -; . . .
:.
. K : A' ;x
* , - -7
.: . . . . : .)K . . . .. .
. ~~ X
: XX X** *r. . . . A *
.j K ri I W 
. :. . .. . .
) .* *, *** -- ,;*
*,7
Ship Size Group: 40,000 - 70,000 DVVT
I IL _ I
0.02 0.04
m~~
:~i *W .W
.. X X
0.06
Inactivity [%]
0.08 0.1 0.12
Figure 2-22: Freight Rates vs. Inactivity
Ship Size Group Idleness Thresholds Rates
(thousands DWT) Oversupply- Overdemand (WS)
40- 70 2.5% - 5% 62
70 - 100 4% - 7% 60 45
100 - 160 12.5% - 30% 37
200- 300 12.5% - 32% 22
As we can see in the figures, freights corresponding in recession periods may vary ( as
well as in other periods). This may be caused:
* High insurance costs due to war in major oil-producing countries.
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Figure 2-23: Freight Rates vs. Inactivity
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* Wide variation of ship sizes even in the groups we have defined. Therefore a differ-
ence in freights is expected.
* A shipowner will add a premium to the ship freight rate when unemployment per-
centage is on a decline. Therefore expectations for the future rates should also be
considered.
2.4.2 Quantitative Analysis - Results
The freight rates for ship sizes 40,000 - 70,000 dwt, in the routes with destination USES
is heavily dependent to the employment of the larger size group (200,000 - 300,000 dwt).
This may be due to the fact that smaller ships are used for the lightering of the larger ones.
Also employment on both size groups is influenced from the same factors i.e. industrial
production of the industrialized countries.
For the other routes, their main characteristic is their small voyage duration, which
invokes a large ratio of days in port over round trip duration. When such a high ratio
is observed, routes are not profitable for VLCC's and smaller ships do not affront their
competition.
***** 40,000 - 70,000 ****************************
Route 03 CAR USES observations: 126
WS = 212.3347 - 815.4292 * I4 + 250.5539 I42
Rad3 = 0.7967
Time lag: 2 months.
Route 07 ECM USES observations: 126
WS = 205.0527 - 757.5117 * I4 + 227.2120 * I4
Radj = 0.7672
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 08 MED NWE observations: 126
WS = 212.7 - 3.3387 * il + 0.8277 * i12
R,dj = 0.7004
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
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Route 09 MED MED observations: 126
WS = 208.7 - 3.1107 * I1 + 0.7756 * I
Ra,dj = 0.7285
Time Lag: 2 months.
Route 16 NWE NWE observations: 126
WS = 171.1 - 2.4027 * I, + 0.6364 * I 2
R,adj = 0.5982
Time- Lag: 1 month.
Route 17 NWE CAR/USES observations: 126
WS = 144.0096 - 248.5824 * 14
Radj = 0.7711
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
***** 70,000 - 100,000 *******************************************
Concerning trade routes served from ships of sizes 70,000 - 100,000 DWT, we may con-
clude that they are strongly influenced from competition of smaller size vessels. No safe
conclusion may be derived for the trade routes Carribean-Europe and Red Sea-Europe as
the fit of regression analysis is low. For this routes data covers a period of 7 years -from
1986 to 1992- instead of 10.5 years. The disturbance caused by Kywait War may be the
cause of such poor fit in regression analysis.
Route 05 Carribean- USES observations: 126
WS = 165.4 + 465.4 * I2 - 2969.9 * I + 606.8 * I12
Radj = 0.5884 High competition from smaller ships
Time lag: 1 month.
Route 06 Carribean - Europe observations: 126
WS = 113.5 + 0.8527 * I2 - 3136.4 * I, + 1240.1 * I3
Radj = 0.2312 High competition from smaller ships.
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Time lag: 2 months . Surprisingly how much it affects accuracy of prediction.
Route 12 MED MED observations: 126
WS = 139.0 + 602.2 * I2 - 1608.0 * I1 - 344.5 * I2
R,adj = 0.5860
High competition from smaller ships.
Time lag: two months.
Route 18 NWE NWE observations: 126
WS = 146.6 + 202.6 * I2 - 2139.8 * I + 462.4 * 12
Rad = 0.5909
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 19 NWE CAR observations: 126
WS = 137.5 + 394.2 * I2 - 2305.2 * I1 + 420.0 * I12
Radj = 0.6258
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 30 AG EAST observations: 126
WS = 162.1 - 2536.5 * I, + 650.7 * I 2
Radj = 0.5769
Very high influence from smaller ships (parallel market)
Time Lag: 2-3 months.
Route 41 RS EUR observations: 90
WS = 144.4 + 552.4 * I2 - 1553.1 * I - 393.4 * 13
Radj = 0.3441
Time lag: 2 months (explained much better with time - lag).
*********** 100,000 - 160,000 ****************************
For vessels that belong to this size group, we observe a very good fit of the estimated
freights from the regression analysis if the idleness of the largest ship size group is used. If
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unemployment of the 100,000 - 160,000 dwt group is used instead, the fit of regression is
very poor ( giving R2dj lower than 0.2 ). This may be due to the fact that ships on both
groups compete each other and the freight rates are defined from what happens on the
largest one, as it represents higher transportation capacity. (92.8 million dwt for group
No.4 and 35.8 million dwt for group No.3).
Route 14 MED MED observations: 126
WS = 108.8431 - 183.3958 * I4
R,,d = 0.7574
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 15 MED NWE observations: 78
Radj was very low (less than 0.4).
Route 25 WA EUR observations: 90
WS = 101.6359 - 207.3427 * I4
Radj = 0.5215
Time Lag: no time lag.
Route 26 WA CAR/USES observations: 126
WS = 90.1930 - 144.9220 * I4
Radj = 0.7131
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 32 AG EAST (FE) observations: 90
WS = 176.2065 - 975.9518 * I4 + 418.7162 * 42
Radj = 0.6189.
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 33 AG EUR observations: 126
WS = 86.4849 - 114.217 * 14
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Radj = 0.7016
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
Route 42 (RS MED) RS EUR observations: 126
not to take off gulf war (shipments from Red Sea)
WS = 99.6279 - 150.6878 * i4
Radj= 0.7145
Time Lag: no time lag was observed.
************* 200,000 - 300,000 DWT *******************************
Route 35 AG EAST (FE) 200-300
WS = 20.9 + 58.4646 * exp(-6.3946 * I4)
Rdj = 0.6369
Time Lag: no time lag.
Route 36 AG EUR
WS = 19.9 + 52.3546 * exp(-6.3103 * I4)
Radj = 0.6798
Time Lag: no time lag.
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2.4.3 Validation Tests
Considering the industrial production of the U.S.A., Japan and O.E.C.D. as given for the
12 months of the 1993, as well as the newbuildings expected to be delivered in the same
time period, we derived the expected freight rates from the above formulas. Results show
agreement with the actual freight rates, as it is shown in the next figures.
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Figure 2-24: Freight Rates in Route NWE-NWE.
74
Cl
1
14
, 
UV
Route 09 : Size Group 40,000 - 70,000
-4 r fIOU
140
130
120
110
100
an
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time: Jan 93 - Feb 94
Figure 2-25: Freight Rates in Route MED-MED.
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Figure 2-26: Freight Rates in Route MED-MED.
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Figure 2-27: Freight Rates in Route WA-EUR.
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Figure 2-28: Freight Rates in Route AG-EUR.
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2.5 Forecasting Freight Rates.
Combining the previous formulas that forecast supply and demand and thus deriving fleet
inactivity by per size group, we were able to predict the expected freight rates. Prediction
of the freight rates that will prevail in the trade routes that have been investigated, covers
the period of the next two years (Jan. 1994 - Dec. 1995).
As input parameters have been used:
1. Prevailing Freight rates in all routes at the beginning of the forecasted period.
2. Industrial Production (assumed) of the U.S.A. , Japan and O.E.C.D. for the next
two years. Three different scenarios (best, medium, worst from the side of the
shipowner) have been assumed. Estimations of future Industrial Production were
based on data given in [9].
3. Orders in shipyards to be delivered. As it takes two years in average for a ship to be
delivered, we know the ships that will join the world fleet for the period of interest
(the following two years).
The structure of the program (see diagram) is as follows:
* Step 1: Forecasting demand transportation capacity: From the industrial production
of the industrialized countries (U.S.A., Japan, O.E.C.D.) we may predict the total
demanded transportation capacity per ship size group for the concerning period.
* Step 2: Forecasting available transportation capacity: From the freight rates in
month (i-1) we may define scrapped tonnage (for each size group) for the next
month (i). Also, as deliveries of newbuildings are given, we may define the available
capacity for each size group in month (i).
* Step 3: Forecasting freight rates: Comparing the available and demanded trans-
portation capacity for each size group, we may derive the expected idleness rate
for each size goup and therefore the prevailing freight rates on the concerning trade
routes in month (i). (Go to step 2)
We may notice the high sensitivity of the forecasted freights on the asssumed industrial
production.
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Results are shown in the following figures:
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Figure 2-29: Industrial Prod. U.S.A.
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Figure 2-31: Industrial Prod. O.E.C.D.
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Figure 2-32: Forecasted Rates in Route : Carribean - U.S.E.S.
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Figure 2-33: Forecasted Rates in Route: Medit. - Medit.
85
84
82
80
U---,78
_ 76
72
70
?0 22
Route 25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Time [months]
Figure 2-34: Forecasted Rates in Route : West Afr. - Europe
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Figure 2-35: Forecasted Available - Demanded Capacity
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Figure 2-37: Forecasted Available - Demanded Capacity
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Figure 2-38: Forecasted Available - Demanded Capacity
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2.6 Towards a better prediction model
Although the model gives a good estimation of future freight trends, further development
may be accomplished, considering the following:
1. The period from which data was gathered, shows stable (and very low) oil prices.
Actually oil prices reached their lowest levels since W.W.II (in real terms). There-
fore, no correlation is expected between tanker freight rates and oil prices. On the
other hand, it is obvious that an increase in oil prices would affect freight rates in
more than one way:
* Increase of vessel's operation costs.
* Consuming countries, afraid of further rise in oil prices will try to increase their
oil reserves. As every one will rush to buy oil at the same time, tanker freight
rates will top up.
It should be noted that this increased demand for oil transportation capacity
will not be accompanied by proportional industrial production.
* While oil prices remain high, industrial countries will move towards recession.
In the same time, they wil try to find alternative ways to supply their industry
(for example, coal). As a result, tanker demand will drop. Effects will be
intensified due to the large reserves built up at the beginning of the cycle.
We conclude therefore that not only oil prices should be considered, but their trend
as well (change from previous months).
2. Combined cargo vessels, i.e. ships that can transport oil or dry cargo, should also
be considered. When transportation rates in the tanker market are high and the dry
cargo market is low, ships from the former market will move to the latter. If freights
are in the same level in both markets, no movement of vessels from one market to
the other should be expected.
Therefore, rates in dry cargo market should also be included
3. Transported oil quantity is less due to hidden inactivity. During periods of low
rates, ships will operate at lower speeds than their service speed (slow steaming) as
a mean to cut their operational costs. Also ships tend to spend more time in ports
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as shipowners use this low-chartering period doing repairs. Finally, more ships are
unhired, but still are not included in the "idle" portion of the analysis, as their time
in port is less than two months.
A way to calculate hidden inactivity due to slow steaming and excess port time, is
to subtract the calculated travel length under normal speed (14.5 knots for almost
all tankers) from the actual days of the voyage length. If we want inactivity in
tons*miles we have to multiply ship's DWT by calculated days of hidden inactivity
by 24 hours by ship's service speed. The same must be done for all ships. By the
term, voyage, we mean round trip (date of departure from a discharge terminal to
the date of departure from the next discharge terminal).
An example of slow steaming is the average speed observed in medium-size tankers
was somewhat less than 12 knots (11.8 knots) although their designed service speed
was higher.
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Chapter 3
Conclusions
As stated in the introduction (Chapter 1), the object of this thesis was the explanation and
prediction of the freight tanker rates. Linear regression theory was used as a mathematical
tool for the analysis. The trade routes examined (24 in total) were different not only in
the prevailing size of operating vessel but also in terms of port of departure and port of
destination, thus giving a global perspective of the market.
The first issue addressed (Chapter 2) was the prediction of the tanker demand. De-
mand for oil transportation is a function of the oil neeeds of the consuming nations, the
portion of oil that has to be transfered by sea, and the distance between producing and
consuming areas. The explanatory variables used were the industrial production of four
countries / group of countries: U.S.A., JAPAN, OECD and EUROPE. The explanatory
power of GDP of U.S.A., JAPAN, U.K, and FRANCE (the last two being two typical
representative countries from Europe) was also examined. The conclusions were the fol-
lowing:
1. Demand for small tankers (size : 40,000 - 70,000 DWT) is proportional to the
industrial production of OECD.
2. For larger size groups (70,00 - 100,000 DWT, 100,000-160,000 DWT and 200,000 -
300,000 DWT) demand is proportional to the industrial production of U.S.A. and
JAPAN.
3. The GDP has no explanatory power if industrial production is already included.
4. Finally, the industrial production of Europe can not be regarded as a variable inde-
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pendent from the industrial production of U.S.A., Japan and OECD.
The second step in this investigation was the prediction of tanker availability. Knowing
the number and size of tankers in the market at a specific time, we may predict availability
in the future by adding newbuildings and subtracting scrapped ships. As it takes two years
to build a ship from the time the order is placed, we are in position to know the time
each ship will reach the market (assuming no delays). To predict the tonnage of scrapped
ships, the explanatory variables used were the condition of the market (prevailing freight
rates) for the same ship size and the portion of the "aged " fleet. The conclusions were:
1. Prevailing freight rates (for similar size ships) give a good estimation of the capacity
to be scrapped for small and medium-size tankers and a mediocre one for VLCC's
and ULCC's.
2. If we consider the "aged" portion of the fleet, we see that it correlates only for
medium and large size tankers. The age at which a ship starts to be considered
"old" is 17 years for medium and 14 years for large tankers.
The third step was the derivation of a relation predicting tanker freight rates consider-
ing tanker availability and tanker demand. The idle portion of the fleet may be calculated
from the tanker availabilty and demand. Freight rates were then expressed as a function
of the idleness. The conclusions were that for trade routes where ships of a certain size
do not affront competition from larger (or smaller) ones, 1 freight ates behavior was the
same. Same behavior in rates was also noticed between similar size ships serving trade
routes with competition from larger (or smaller) size ships.
As a final step of the development of my model, all the equations derived from the
above analysis were integrated in a tanker's freight rate forecast program. Testing the
code for validity, the period from June 1993 to May 1994 was examined. The predicted
results were consistent with the actual ones.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I derived the future behavior of the tanker market for the period
June 1994 - May 1996, assuming three different scenarios for the industrial production
(and the consecutive demand in oil) of the industrialized countries. The market shows
1As stated in Chapter 1, larger ships may not be competent to serve in a trade route, due to draft
limitations of ports - canals and due to small distances to be travelled . Increased ratio of days in port
over total round trip duration makes larger ships unfavorable, despite the economy of scale they pesent.
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to be in equilibrium, and no excess in supply or demand of transportation capacity is
expected under the scenarios assumed.
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Appendix A
Loading Zones - Draft[2 ]
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1) West Africa 1
Country Port Draft (ft)
Zaire BANANA 35
Congo DENJO 53
Gabon GAMBA 44
Congo POINTE NOIRE 34
Angola QUINFUQUENA 46
Gabon PORT GENTIL 43
Togo LOME 31
Nigeria ESCRAVOS no res.
Nigeria BONNY no res.
Nigeria FORCADOS no res.
Angola CABINDA no res.
Nigeria LUCINA no res.
Nigeria PENNINGION no res.
Gabon CAP LOPEZ no res.
Nigeria BRASS no res.
Nigeria QUAI-BOE no res.
1 "no res." stands for: No restriction in draft
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2) Arabian Gulf
Country Port Draft (ft)
Abu Dhabi JEBEL DHANA 45-49
Iran LAVAN ISLAND 43
Kuwait MINA SAUD 52/56
Sharrjah HAMRIYAH 55
Qatar UMM SAUD 43-60
Adu Dhabi MUBARRAS ISLAND 45-54
Abu Dhabi DAS ISLAND 50-79
Kuwait MINA AL AHMADI 49/59/94/100
Saudi Arabia RAS AL KHAFJI 47-64
Saudi Arabia RAS TANURA no res.
Iran KHARG ISLAND no res.
Dubai FATEH TERMINAL no res.
Oman MINA AL FAHAL no res.
Iran SIRRI ISLAND no res.
Qatar HALUL ISLAND no res.
Saudi Arabia RAS AL KHAFJI no res.
Abu Dhabi ABU AL BU KHOOSH no res.
Abu Dhabi ZIRKU ISLAND no res.
Sharjah MUBAREK TERMINAL no res.
3) S E Asia
Country Port Draft (ft)
Indonesia DUMAI 54
Malaysia MIRI no res.
Brunei SERIA no res.
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4) North Africa
Country Port Draft (ft)
Libya TOBRUK 46
Algeria ARZEW 49
Libya MARSA EL BREGA 35
Libya ES SIDER no res.
Libya ZUEITINA no res.
Libya RAS LANUF no res.
5) Carribean
Country Port Draft (ft)
Mexico COATZALCOALCOS 29
Mexico CAYOS ARCOS TERMINAL
St. Lucia CUL DE SAC
Venezuela PUERTO MIRANDA 36
Venezuela LA SALINA 39
Mexico DOS BOCAS
Trinidad GALEOTA MPOINT no res.
N.Antilles BONAIRE no res.
N.Antilles BULLEN DAY no res.
6) North Europe
Country Port Draft (ft)
United Kingdom SULLOM VOE 42
United Kingdom TEES 55
United Kingdom HOUND POINT no res.
United Kingdom SCAPA FLOW no res.
Netherlands EUROPOORT no res.
France LE HAVRE no res.
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7a) Eastern Mediterranean
Country Port Draft (ft)
Turkey CEYHAN TERMINAL 37
Lebanon TRIPOLI 56
Turkey ISKENDERUXh/ 30
Syria TARTOUS 33
Egypt SIDI KERIR no res.
7b)Iraq pipelines
Country Port Draft (ft)
Syria BANIAS no res.
Lebanon TRIPOLI no res.
8) Red Sea
Country Port Draft (ft)
Egypt RAS SHUKHEIR 55
Sudan PORT SUDAN 37
Saudi Arabia YENBU no res.
Egypt WADI FEIRAN no res.
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Appendix B
Discharge Zones - Drafts[2]
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1)South Europe
Country Port Draft (ft)
Italy TRIESTE 54
Italy LEGHORN 34/37
Italy SARROCH 58
Italy VENICE 29/31
Italy SAVONNA 30/34
Italy LA SPEZIA 40
Spain MALAGA 32
Spain HUELVA 28/40
Italy GENOA 48/57
Italy AUGUSTA no.res
France FOS no.res
Italy TARANTO no.res
Italy MELLILI no.res
2) North Europe
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Country Port Draft (ft)
Netherlands ROTTERDAM 36
West Germany BRUNSBUTTEL 26/34
United Kingdom IMMINGHAM 34/49
France DUNKIRK 47
Denmark GULFHAVN 49
Denmark TETNEY TERMINAL 60
France DONGES 47
Sweden GOTHENBURG 43/64
Sweden BROFJORDEN 26/42/82
Netherlands EUROPOORT no.res
United Kingdom MILFORD HAVEN no.res
Germany WILHELMSHAVEN no.res
France LE HAVRE no.res
Norway MONGSTAD no.res
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3) United States Eastern Seaboard
Country Port Draft (ft)
U.S.A. PHILADELPHIA 55
U.S.A. NEW ORLEANS 40
U.S.A. GALVESTON 40
U.S.A. BEAUMONT 38
U.S.A. NEW YORK 36/38
U.S.A. CORPUS CHRITI 39/45
U.S.A. PORT ARTHUR 40
U.S.A. FREEPORT (TEXAS) 36
U.S.A. HOUSTON 39
U.S.A. LOOP TERMINAL 110
4) East Coast South America
Country Port Draft (ft)
Brazil RIO DE JANEIRO 52
Brazil AREIA BRANCA
Brazil TRAMANDAI 52/89
Brazil ANGRA DOS REIS no.res
Brazil SAO SEBASTIAO no.res
5) Japan
Country Port Draft (ft)
Japan SAKAIDE 30
Japan SAKAI 51
Japan MIZUSHIMA 49
Japan YOKOHAMA 55/64
Japan KIIRE 56/89/108
Japan CHIBA 28/42/52/67
Japan KASHIMA no.res
Japan OKINAWA no.res
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6) South East Asia
Country Port Draft (ft)
Philippines BATANGAS 39
Thailand SRIRACHA 50
Thailand BANGKOK 35/47
Hong Kong HONG KONG 42
Singapore SINGAPORE ROADS 28/33/38/73
Singapore PULAU BUKOM
7) Caribbean
Country Port Draft (ft)
Virgin Is. HOVIC 60
Bahamas FREEPORT 40/47/50/51/82/83
Trinidad POINT A PIERRE 22/33/35/37/74
N.Antilles SAN NICHOLAS BAY no.res
N.Antilles BULLEN BAY no.res
N.Antilles BONAIRE no.res
Bahamas SOUTH RIDING POINT no.res
8) West Coast United States
Country Port Draft (ft)
U.S.A. LOS ANGELES 31/51
U.S.A. SAN FRANCISCO 35
U.S.A. PORT ANGELES 45
U.S.A. FERNDALE 40
U.S.A. EL SEGUNDO 56
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Appendix
Industrial Production Index[10]
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C
Month No. U.S.A. Japan Europe O.E.C.D.
1 93.6000 101.5000 96.8000 95.5000
2 93.6000 100.7000 96.8000 95.5000
3 95.2000 102.9000 96.8000 96.3000
4 96.8000 102.9000 96.0000 97.1000
5 98.4000 102.9000 97.7000 98.0000
6 99.2000 103.7000 97.7000 98.7000
7 101.8000 103.9000 97.7000 99.9000
8 103.3000 106.6000 97.0000 100.4000
9 104.8000 108.5000 97.8000 101.7000
10 105.4000 107.2000 97.7000 101.7000
11 105.6000 109.4000 99.5000 103.0000
12 106.3000 110.4000 99.2000 103.1000
13 107.8000 110.6000 101.3000 104.9000
14 108.8000 114.5000 100.5000 105.3000
15 109.4000 112.8000 100.0000 105.1000
16 110.3000 113.4000 98.4000 104.7000
17 110.7000 116.1000 100.4000 106.3000
18 111.8000 116.7000 97.0000 105.1000
19 112.9000 117.2000 100.8000 107.4000
20 113.0000 118.1000 101.0000 107.7000
21 112.2000 116.7000 101.6000 107.5000
22 111.8000 120.2000 101.7000 107.9000
23 112.1000 120.6000 101.9000 108.1000
24 112.1000 120.0000 101.4000 107.9000
25 112.3000 120.3000 101.1000 107.9000
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Month No. U.S.A. Japan Europe O.E.C.D.
26 113.9000 120.1000 102.4000 108.5000
27 114.2000 118.4000 103.8000 109.5000
28 114.3000 121.5000 102.4000 109.3000
29 114.3000 124.6000 103.2000 110.2000
30 114.5000 122.0000 104.2000 110.4000
31 114.3000 124.3000 104.9000 111.1000
32 115.3000 122.8000 104.2000 110.8000
33 115.2000 121.6000 104.6000 110.8000
34 114.5000 122.5000 105.5000 111.2000
35 115.5000 121.3000 106.9000 112.0000
36 116.4000 121.6000 102.9000 110.5000
37 116.7000 121.6000 104.5000 111.4000
38 115.7000 122.1000 105.5000 111.5000
39 113.8000 121.5000 105.4000 110.7000
40 114.8000 121.6000 107.1000 112.0000
41 114.4000 122.0000 103.9000 110.3000
42 114.4000 122.2000 106.8000 111.7000
43 115.0000 121.9000 107.6000 112.3000
44 115.2000 118.8000 106.4000 111.3000
45 115.0000 123.0000 106.8000 112.0000
46 115.4000 120.7000 107.3000 112.2000
47 116.0000 119.3000 107.0000 112.0000
48 116.7000 122.8000 106.0000 112.4000
49 116.5000 122.4000 105.0000 111.7000
50 117.1000 121.6000 107.2000 113.3000
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Month No. U.S.A. Japan Europe O.E.C.D.
51 117.2000 123.7000 107.7000 113.9000
52 117.3000 122.0000 107.8000 113.6000
53 118.0000 120.6000 109.2000 114.5000
54 118.9000 125.3000 108.5000 115.3000
55 120.3000 126.7000 108.6000 116.0000
56 120.8000 125.3000 108.4000 115.5000
57 120.6000 124.6000 109.1000 115.7000
58 122.0000 126.8000 110.1000 117.0000
59 122.7000 127.1000 110.4000 117.5000
60 123.3000 128.6000 109.7000 117.6000
61 123.8000 129.1000 111.2000 118.4000
62 123.8000 132.6000 110.3000 118.6000
63 124.0000 132.9000 111.4000 119.3000
64 124.7000 131.9000 111.7000 119.4000
65 125.3000 128.8000 111.6000 119.2000
66 125.7000 133.1000 113.3000 120.9000
67 127.2000 131.4000 113.7000 121.3000
68 127.3000 135.1000 113.1000 121.8000
69 127.7000 135.8000 114.7000 122.8000
70 128.2000 135.6000 114.1000 122.2000
71 127.6000 139.0000 115.3000 123.3000
72 127.8000 139.3000 115.7000 123.6000
73 128.3000 140.2000 116.0000 123.9000
74 128.1000 138.1000 115.4000 123.4000
75 128.2000 144.3000 115.6000 124.5000
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Month No. U.S.A. Japan Europe O.E.C.D.
76 129.0000 139.9000 117.5000 124.5000
77 129.0000 140.6000 114.4000 124.0000
78 129.3000 143.0000 117.4000 125.5000
79 129.2000 140.0000 118.4000 125.3000
80 129.7000 143.5000 118.4000 126.1000
81 129.1000 141.6000 117.7000 125.4000
82 128.6000 141.6000 118.5000 125.4000
83 129.0000 142.7000 119.0000 125.9000
84 129.5000 142.8000 119.6000 126.5000
85 128.4000 142.8000 119.3000 125.8000
86 129.4000 142.9000 118.4000 125.9000
87 129.9000 144.7000 119.7000 126.7000
88 129.8000 143.8000 118.6000 126.2000
89 130.4000 147.0000 119.1000 127.2000
90 131.1000 147.1000 120.2000 127.9000
91 131.4000 149.3000 120.2000 128.5000
92 131.4000 149.8000 120.6000 128.7000
93 131.6000 148.4000 120.6000 128.4000
94 130.6000 151.4000 119.8000 128.4000
95 129.2000 150.7000 119.0000 127.2000
96 128.1000 149.8000 119.2000 126.6000
97 127.4000 151.9000 120.4000 127.1000
98 126.5000 151.8000 120.5000 126.7000
99 125.7000 149.1000 118.6000 125.2000
100 126.3000 149.4000 118.3000 125.5000
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Month No. U.S.A. Japan Europe O.E.C.D.
101 127.2000 152.2000 118.7000 126.4000
102 128.2000 148.9000 121.2000 127.3000
103 128.9000 152.8000 120.3000 127.9000
104 128.9000 148.9000 118.3000 126.4000
105 129.3000 149.5000 119.7000 127.3000
106 129.3000 150.0000 119.9000 127.4000
107 129.0000 149.9000 120.1000 127.3000
108 128.3000 148.0000 117.6000 125.6000
109 127.4000 147.5000 119.8000 126.1000
110 128.1000 146.6000 120.8000 126.6000
111 128.5000 143.1000 120.1000 125.9000
112 129.0000 143.5000 118.8000 125.7000
113 129.9000 141.4000 119.1000 125.9000
114 129.4000 144.0000 118.7000 125.8000
115 130.4000 144.9000 119.3000 126.6000
116 130.1000 140.2000 117.8000 125.1000
117 129.9000 145.7000 118.0000 126.1000
118 130.7000 142.4000 118.2000 126.0000
119 131.3000 140.1000 116.2000 125.0000
120 131.6000 139.0000 115.2000 124.4000
121 132.0120 138.2895 113.6666 124.0740
122 132.6960 138.8820 115.0173 125.1720
123 132.9240 142.5555 114.9134 125.8308
124 133.2660 138.7635 112.9393 124.5132
125 133.0380 135.4455 114.8095 124.7328
126 133.4940 137.6970 113.6666 124.7328
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Appendix D
Gross National Product Index.[9]
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Month No. France Japan U.K. U.S.A.
1 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
2 100.6000 104.4000 106.0000 111.8000
3 99.4000 110.6000 109.2000 119.4000
4 101.8000 113.7000 111.7000 127.9000
5 104.6000 121.1000 115.2000 137.6000
6 102.0000 127.8000 111.5000 145.2000
7 106.0000 132.3000 112.3000 146.9000
8 108.8000 141.8000 118.5000 151.2000
9 108.5000 142.2000 121.5000 151.9000
10 112.0000 150.1000 126.4000 153.9000
11 114.4000 152.7000 128.2000 158.2000
12 116.8000 159.9000 130.4000 1 158.9000
13 118.0000 157.9000 131.8000 162.6000
14 122.5000 161.5000 132.5000 163.2000
15 123.3000 163.9000 136.4000 165.6000
16 124.9000 167.1000 139.2000 166.7000
17 125.7000 170.1000 140.9000 171.0000
18 128.9000 170.1000 143.0000 173.3000
19 133.3000 178.5000 151.8000 177.1000
20 134.9000 185.5000 155.8000 181.6000
21 139.8000 196.8000 158.5000 185.2000
22 142.2000 192.9000 160.3000 188.2000
23 145.3000 202.0000 165.1000 190.7000
24 147.3000 I 205.0000 167.3000 192.7000
25 152.1000 214.1000 168.7000 197.1000
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Month No. France Japan U.K. U.S.A.
26 155.3000 211.0000 167.3000 198.8000
27 157.7000 223.2000 169.4000 201.8000
28 162.2000 226.2000 171.8000 202.7000
29 165.0000 236.6000 174.6000 204.8000
30 165.4000 240.2000 178.4000 206.0000
31 170.7000 244.3000 174.4000 207.7000
32 169.1000 246.4000 170.6000 205.7000
33 169.0000 257.6000 168.2000 203.1000
34 172.2000 259.6000 164.4000 203.0000
35 175.5000 261.2000 165.5000 204.7000
36 175.5000 261.3000 164.4000 205.5000
37 180.0000 264.7000 161.9000 207.9000
38 180.4000 265.4000 161.5000 209.3000
39 182.0000 263.9000 161.9000 212.7000
40 180.0000 263.6000 162.3000 217.5000
Appendix E
Total Transportation Capacity[lO]
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Month 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
1 1 5.4 10.5 14.8 4.4 9.1 8.6 8.95 17.0 9.2
2 5.4 10.6 14.9 4.35 9.0 8.5 8.9 17.2 9.2
3 5.4 10.6 14.9 4.35 8.85 8.5 8.9 17.2 9.2
4 5.5 10.6 14.9 4.2 8.6 8.6 8.8 17.0 9.0
5 5.5 10.6 14.8 4.4 8.5 8.5 8.5 17.0 8.8
6 5.4 10.6 14.8 4.3 8.5 8.55 8.4 16.9 9.1
7 5.4 10.6 14.8 4.4 8.5 8.4 8.4 17.0 9.1
8 5.4 10.5 14.7 4.3 8.6 8.5 8.3 17.2 8.8
9 5.4 10.4 14.8 4.3 8.5 8.4 8.1 17.2 8.8
10 5.4 10.4 14.8 4.35 8.5 8.3 8.0 17.15 8.8
11 5.3 10.3 14.8 4.3 8.4 8.2 7.8 17.0 8.7
12 5.3 10.3 14.8 4.3 8.4 8.1 7.8 17.0 8.7
13 5.1 10.0 14.7 3.9 8.1 9.5 6.1 17.9 8.8
14 5.1 10.0 14.8 3.9 8.2 9.4 6.1 17.8 8.8
15 5.1 10.0 14.9 3.9 8.2 9.3 6.1 17.7 8.8
16 5.1 10.0 14.9 3.9 8.2 9.3 6.1 17.8 8.8
17 5.2 10.4 15.1 3.9 8.0 9.3 6.1 17.6 8.9
18 5.1 10.3 15.0 3.9 8.0 9.3 6.1 17.6 8.9
19 5.0 10.1 14.9 3.8 8.0 9.2 6.1 17.5 8.8
20 5.0 10.0 14.9 3.8 8.0 9.2 5.9 17.4 8.6
21 4.9 9.7 14.9 4.0 7.9 9.4 5.7 17.5 8.7
22 5.0 9.7 14.8 3.9 7.9 9.4 5.7 17.4 8.6
23 5.0 9.7 14.9 3.9 7.8 9.7 5.7 17.1 8.5
24 4.9 9.6 14.8 3.9 7.8 9.9 5.6 17.1 8.7
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Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
25 9.5 5.0 7.1 10.1 6.0 9.4 9.3 17.1 8.7
26 9.4 5.0 7.1 10.2 6.0 9.3 9.3 17.0 8.7
27 9.5 5.2 7.1 10.5 6.1 9.2 9.4 16.9 8.6
28 9.5 5.2 7.1 10.3 6.1 9.3 9.4 16.8 8.5
29 9.5 5.3 6.8 10.0 6.2 8.9 9.6 16.7 8.4
30 9.4 5.3 6.8 10.0 6.2 8.8 9.7 16.7 8.3
31 9.3 5.3 6.8 10.1 6.2 8.7 9.7 16.6 8.1
32 9.3 5.4 6.9 10.1 6.1 8.7 9.7 16.6 8.1
33 9.2 5.4 6.9 10.1 6.2 8.6 9.4 16.5 8.0
34 9.1 5.3 6.9 10.1 6.1 8.6 9.4 16.5 7.9
35 9.1 5.3 6.9 10.1 6.1 8.5 9.4 16.7 7.9
36 9.0 5.3 6.8 10.2 6.1 8.5 9.3 16.8 7.9
37 9.0 5.4 6.6 10.0 6.1 8.3 8.9 17.1 7.7
38 8.9 5.4 6.5 10.1 6.2 8.3 8.9 17.0 7.6
39 8.9 5.5 6.4 10.1 6.2 8.3 8.9 17.1 7.6
40 8.9 5.5 6.5 10.1 6.1 8.4 9.0 17.1 7.6
41 9.1 5.6 6.7 10.6 6.0 8.4 9.0 17.2 7.6
42 9.1 5.6 6.7 10.6 6.0 8.4 9.0 17.4 7.6
43 9.1 5.6 6.8 10.5 5.7 8.4 9.0 17.5 7.6
44 9.1 5.6 6.8 10.6 5.6 8.4 9.1 17.5 7.6
45 9.1 5.7 6.7 10.4 5.8 8.3 8.9 17.6 7.7
46 9.1 5.7 6.7 10.5 5.7 8.3 8.9 17.6 7.8
47 9.1 5.7 6.7 10.5 5.6 8.3 9.0 17.7 7.9
48 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.5 5.6 8.3 9.0 17.7 8.0
49 9.1 5.8 6.6 10.4 5.6 8.3 9.0 17.9 8.0
50 9.1 5.8 6.7 10.4 5.4 8.1 9.1 17.8 7.9
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Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
51 9.1 5.8 6.6 10.4 5.4 8.2 9.2 18.0 7.9
52 9.2 5.8 6.7 10.5 5.4 8.2 9.3 18.1 7.9
53 9.1 5.8 6.7 10.5 5.4 8.3 9.3 18.2 7.9
54 9.1 5.8 6.7 10.5 5.4 8.3 9.3 18.0 7.9
55 9.1 5.8 6.7 10.3 5.6 8.0 9.6 18.0 8.2
56 9.1 5.8 6.6 10.3 5.5 8.1 9.6 18.0 8.2
57 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.2 5.7 8.1 9.3 18.4 8.2
58 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.2 5.7 8.2 9.3 18.5 8.2
59 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.2 5.8 8.1 9.3 18.4 8.2
60 9.1 5.6 6.6 10.3 5.8 8.1 9.2 18.6 8.3
61 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.4 5.7 8.1 9.2 18.8 8.3
62 9.1 5.6 6.6 10.4 5.7 8.1 9.2 18.8 8.3
63 9.1 5.6 6.6 10.5 5.7 8.1 9.2 18.9 8.3
64 9.1 5.7 6.6 10.7 5.7 8.1 9.4 19.0 8.3
65 8.9 5.6 6.6 10.7 5.6 8.1 9.3 19.0 8.2
66 8.9 5.6 6.6 10.6 5.6 8.3 9.4 18.9 8.2
67 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.8 5.4 8.4 9.2 19.4 7.8
68 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.9 5.4 8.4 9.2 19.6 7.8
69 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.9 5.4 8.3 9.2 19.4 7.7
70 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.9 5.2 8.3 9.3 19.4 7.7
71 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.1 5.3 8.4 9.3 19.4 7.7
72 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.1 5.4 8.4 9.3 19.6 7.7
73 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.2 5.4 8.4 9.3 19.6 7.7
74 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.3 5.4 8.4 9.3 19.6 7.7
75 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.3 5.4 8.4 9.3 19.7 7.7
120
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
76 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.3 5.4 8.4 9.4 19.7 7.8
77 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.4 5.3 8.5 9.4 19.8 7.8
78 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.4 5.4 8.5 9.4 19.7 7.8
79 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.5 5.4 8.5 9.4 19.8 7.8
80 8.8 5.8 6.6 11.6 5.4 8.6 9.3 19.8 7.9
81 8.8 5.8 6.7 11.6 5.3 8.6 9.1 19.9 8.2
82 8.8 5.7 6.8 11.9 5.0 9.0 8.4 19.9 8.7
83 8.8 5.7 6.8 11.9 5.0 9.0 8.3 20.0 8.7
84 8.8 5.7 6.8 11.9 5.0 9.0 8.3 20.0 8.8
85 8.8 5.8 6.8 12.0 5.0 9.0 8.4 20.2 9.0
86 8.8 5.8 6.8 12.1 5.0 9.0 8.3 20.2 9.2
87 8.8 5.8 6.8 12.1 5.05 9.0 8.3 20.2 9.3
88 8.7 5.9 6.8 12.0 5.0 9.0 8.5 20.3 9.3
89 8.7 5.9 6.8 12.0 5.0 9.0 8.5 20.3 9.5
90 8.7 5.9 6.8 12.0 5.1 9.0 8.5 20.3 9.6
91 8.7 5.9 6.8 12.0 5.1 9.0 8.5 20.3 9.8
92 8.7 6.0 6.8 12.0 5.2 9.0 8.5 20.1 10.2
93 8.7 6.0 6.8 12.1 5.2 9.0 8.5 20.1 10.3
94 8.7 6.0 6.8 12.1 5.2 9.0 8.6 20.2 10.3
95 8.7 6.1 6.7 12.1 5.2 8.9 8.7 20.2 10.4
96 8.7 6.1 6.7 12.1 5.2 8.9 8.7 20.3 10.5
97 8.7 6.1 6.7 12.1 5.2 8.9 8.7 20.2 10.4
98 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.1 5.3 9.0 8.8 20.3 10.8
99 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.1 5.3 9.0 8.9 20.3 10.8
121
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
100 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.3 5.3 9.0 9.0 20.3 11.0
101 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.3 5.3 9.0 9.0 20.3 11.1
102 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.4 5.3 9.0 9.0 20.2 11.0
103 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.4 5.3 9.0 9.0 20.2 11.1
104 8.7 6.2 6.8 12.5 5.4 9.0 8.9 20.3 11.1
105 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.5 5.4 9.0 8.8 20.1 11.3
106 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.5 5.4 9.0 8.8 20.1 11.5
107 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.5 5.4 9.1 8.8 20.1 11.5
108 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.5 5.4 9.0 8.8 20.2 11.6
109 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.6 5.4 9.0 8.8 20.3 11.7
110 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.7 5.4 9.0 8.7 20.3 11.6
111 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.8 5.3 8.9 8.7 20.3 11.9
112 8.7 6.3 6.8 12.8 5.2 8.8 8.6 20.3 11.9
113 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.2 8.8 8.6 20.3 12.2
114 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.3 8.8 8.6 20.6 12.3
115 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.7 5.3 8.8 8.5 20.6 12.4
116 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.4 8.8 8.4 20.6 12.6
117 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.4 8.7 8.4 20.6 13.0
118 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.4 8.7 8.4 20.6 13.0
119 8.7 6.4 6.8 12.8 5.4 8.7 8.4 20.7 13.1
120 8.7 6.4 6.7 12.8 5.4 8.6 8.4 20.6 13.1
121 8.7 6.4 6.7 12.8 5.4 8.7 8.4 20.6 13.1
122 8.7 6.4 6.7 12.8 5.4 8.8 8.3 20.5 13.3
123 8.6 6.4 6.7 12.8 5.4 8.8 8.3 20.6 13.5
124 8.6 6.4 6.7 12.8 5.4 8.8 8.3 20.6 13.4
125 8.6 6.4 6.7 12.9 5.4 8.8 8.4 20.7 13.4
126 8.6 6.4 6.7 12.9 5.3 8.8 8.5 20.6 13.4
122
Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
1 12.9 18.1 9.8 3.3 12.4 112.9 42.9
2 12.9 17.9 9.6 3.3 12.2 112.4 42.9
3 12.9 17.9 9.6 3.3 12.0 112.2 42.99
4 13.0 17.9 9.5 3.3 12.0 111.0 42.9
5 13.0 18.0 9.5 3.3 11.1 110.0 42.9
6 12.7 17.9 9.5 3.3 10.7 108.0 42.25
7 12.8 17.8 9.5 3.3 10.4 106.8 42.25
8 12.8 17.6 9.6 3.3 10.7 106.55 42.25
9 12.7 17.6 9.6 3.3 9.8 105.6 42.25
10 12.7 17.7 9.5 3.3 9.6 104.3 42.3
11 12.7 17.6 9.3 3.3 9.1 103.8 41.7
12 12.7 17.7 9.3 3.1 8.9 103.6 41.4
13 11.8 18.0 9.4 3.1 8.1 104.1 40.7
14 11.9 18.0 9.4 3.1 7.4 103.9 40.7
15 11.9 18.0 9.4 3.1 7.2 103.4 41.0
16 11.8 17.9 9.4 3.1 7.2 103.3 41.0
17 11.9 18.0 9.4 3.1 6.9 102.3 40.7
18 11.7 18.0 9.4 3.1 6.3 101.0 40.4
19 11.7 18.0 9.2 3.1 6.3 99.7 40.3
20 11.7 17.9 9.2 3.1 6.3 99.5 40.0
21 11.3 18.7 9.2 2.9 6.8 98.2 40.0
22 11.2 18.6 9.2 2.9 6.6 98.0 39.3
23 11.2 18.6 9.2 2.8 6.6 96.5 39.0
24 11.2 18.5 9.4 2.6 6.6 96.0 39.0
25 11.2 18.5 9.4 2.6 6.6 95.3 39.0
123
Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
26 11.2 18.5 9.4 2.6 6.6 94.5 39.0
27 11.2 18.5 9.4 2.6 5.9 93.4 38.9
28 11.2 18.4 9.4 2.6 5.7 91.7 38.9
29 11.3 18.3 9.7 2.6 5.2 90.2 38.3
30 11.2 18.3 9.5 2.6 5.2 88.6 37.6
31 11.2 18.3 9.2 2.6 5.5 87.3 37.6
32 11.2 18.3 9.2 2.6 5.2 86.7 36.9
33 10.8 18.3 9.2 2.6 5.0 85.7 36.9
34 10.7 18.3 9.2 2.6 4.8 84.9 36.9
35 10.6 18.3 9.2 2.6 4.8 83.3 36.5
36 10.6 18.3 9.2 2.6 4.8 82.3 36.0
37 11.1 18.1 9.2 2.5 4.6 81.4 35.1
38 11.0 17.9 9.2 2.5 4.6 80.4 34.5
39 11.0 17.8 9.2 2.5 4.6 79.6 34.2
40 11.0 17.8 9.1 2.5 4.6 78.5 33.8
42 11.0 17.8 8.9 2.5 3.9 77.8 32.2
43 11.1 17.8 8.9 2.5 3.9 77.5 31.7
44 11.0 17.7 8.9 2.5 3.9 77.0 31.7
45 10.9 17.6 9.2 2.2 3.5 77.7 31.9
46 11.1 17.6 9.2 2.2 3.5 78.0 31.9
47 11.1 17.6 9.2 2.2 3.5 78.2 31.9
48 11.1 17.5 9.2 2.2 3.5 79.5 31.6
49 11.2 17.5 9.2 2.2 3.7 79.5 31.6
50 11.2 17.4 9.2 2.2 3.7 78.7 31.2
124
Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
51 11.3 17.4 9.2 2.2 3.7 78.5 30.9
52 11.5 17.4 9.2 2.2 3.9 78.0 30.9
53 11.5 17.4 9.2 2.2 3.9 77.5 30.9
54 11.4 17.2 9.2 2.2 3.9 77.2 30.6
55 11.2 16.5 8.8 2.5 3.9 76.0 30.6
56 11.2 16.6 9.0 2.5 3.9 75.7 30.6
57 11.2 16.6 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.2 30.5
58 11.2 16.6 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.5 30.5
59 11.1 16.7 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.7 30.5
60 11.1 16.7 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.7 30.5
61 11.4 16.6 8.8 2.6 3.9 76.0 30.5
62 11.4 16.7 8.8 2.6 3.9 76.0 30.5
63 11.5 16.7 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.5 30.5
64 11.6 16.7 8.8 2.6 3.9 75.5 30.5
65 11.6 16.8 8.6 2.4 3.9 76.0 30.5
66 11.6 16.8 8.6 2.4 3.9 76.0 30.5
67 11.4 17.1 8.3 2.4 3.9 75.8 30.1
68 11.4 17.5 8.2 2.4 3.9 75.8 30.1
69 11.4 17.5 8.2 2.4 3.7 75.8 30.1
70 11.4 17.6 8.3 2.4 3.7 75.8 30.1
71 11.5 17.7 8.3 2.4 3.5 76.5 30.1
72 11.5 17.7 8.3 2.4 3.5 77.0 30.1
73 11.5 18.0 8.1 2.4 3.5 77.2 30.1
74 11.8 18.0 8.1 2.4 3.5 77.7 30.1
75 11.9 18.1 8.3 2.4 3.3 77.7 30.1
125
Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
76 12.0 18.3 8.3 2.4 3.3 78.0 30.1
77 12.0 18.3 8.3 2.4 3.3 78.0 30.1
78 12.0 18.3 8.3 2.4 3.3 78.2 30.5
79 12.0 18.4 8.3 2.4 3.3 78.2 30.5
80 12.0 18.4 8.3 2.4 3.3 78.7 30.5
81 12.2 18.2 8.0 2.9 3.3 78.5 30.5
82 11.7 18.6 8.3 3.1 3.3 78.9 30.5
83 11.7 18.6 8.3 3.1 3.3 78.6 31.2
84 11.7 18.7 8.1 3.1 3.5 79.1 31.2
85 11.6 18.7 8.2 3.1 3.5 79.1 31.2
86 11.8 18.7 8.2 3.1 3.5 79.4 31.2
87 11.8 19.2 8.2 3.1 3.5 80.2 31.2
88 11.7 19.3 8.2 3.1 3.3 81.2 31.2
89 11.6 19.4 8.2 3.1 3.3 81.2 31.2
90 11.8 19.5 8.5 3.1 3.3 81.7 31.2
91 11.8 19.6 8.5 3.1 3.3 82.2 31.2
92 12.0 19.7 8.5 3.1 3.3 83.0 31.2
93 12.1 19.8 8.3 3.1 3.3 83.3 31.2
94 12.1 19.8 8.3 3.1 3.3 83.6 31.2
95 12.2 19.8 8.3 3.1 3.3 83.6 31.2
96 12.2 19.8 8.3 3.1 3.3 83.6 31.2
97 12.2 19.8 8.3 3.1 3.3 83.6 31.2
98 12.3 19.7 8.2 3.1 3.3 84.1 31.2
99 12.1 19.7 8.2 3.1 3.3 84.4 31.2
100 12.1 20.0 8.3 3.1 3.3 85.0 31.2
126
Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
101 12.1 20.0 8.3 3.1 3.3 85.0 31.2
102 12.1 20.0 8.5 3.1 3.3 85.0 31.2
103 12.1 20.2 8.5 3.1 3.3 85.2 31.2
104 12.1 20.4 8.6 3.1 3.3 85.8 31.2
105 12.2 20.6 8.5 3.1 3.3 86.3 31.2
106 12.2 21.4 8.9 3.1 3.3 86.8 31.2
107 12.2 21.5 8.9 3.1 3.3 87.0 31.2
108 12.4 21.6 8.6 3.1 3.3 87.3 31.2
109 12.4 21.7 8.9 3.1 3.3 87.6 31.2
110 12.4 21.9 8.9 3.1 3.3 88.7 31.2
111 12.3 21.9 9.2 3.1 3.3 89.0 31.2
112 12.3 22.3 9.2 2.9 3.1 89.5 31.2
113 12.3 22.5 9.2 2.9 3.1 89.7 31.2
114 12.4 23.5 9.2 2.9 3.1 90.2 31.2
115 12.5 23.6 9.4 2.9 2.9 89.9 31.5
116 12.5 23.6 9.4 2.9 2.9 90.5 31.5
117 12.5 23.6 9.4 2.9 2.9 90.0 31.5
118 12.1 23.5 9.4 2.9 2.9 89.7 31.8
119 12.2 23.5 9.4 2.9 2.9 89.4 31.8
120 12.3 23.5 9.4 2.9 2.9 89.9 31.8
121 12.2 23.7 9.4 2.9 2.7 89.7 31.8
122 12.2 23.7 9.5 2.9 2.7 90.4 32.1
123 12.2 23.4 9.5 2.9 2.5 90.4 32.4
124 12.2 23.4 9.2 2.9 2.5 90.7 32.7
125 12.3 23.4 9.2 2.9 2.3 91.5 32.7
126 12.3 23.4 9.2 2.9 2.3 92.4 32.7
127
Appendix F
Demanded Transportation Capacity.[10]
128
Month 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
1 5.1 9.8 13.9 3.9 8.2 7.1 7.7 15.8 7.9
2 5.1 10.0 14.2 3.9 8.1 7.2 7.7 15.9 7.7
3 5.2 9.9 14.15 4.0 8.15 7.1 7.6 16.0 7.5
4 5.2 9.8 14.2 3.9 8.0 7.3 7.4 15.8 7.2
5 5.2 9.7 14.2 4.0 7.8 7.1 7.1 15.6 7.1
6 5.2 9.9 14.1 3.95 7.9 7.3 7.1 15.5 7.4
7 5.2 9.8 14.25 4.0 7.9 7.05 7.1 15.75 7.5
8 5.1 9.8 14.2 3.9 8.0 7.3 7.0 16.0 7.6
9 5.2 9.5 14.0 3.85 7.8 7.4 6.85 16.1 7.7
10 5.2 9.6 14.2 4.0 7.9 7.4 6.8 16.2 7.9
11 5.1 9.6 14.2 3.8 7.7 7.2 6.7 16.0 8.1
12 5.0 9.5 14.1 3.7 7.7 7.0 6.8 16.1 7.9
13 4.9 9.3 14.0 3.3 7.3 8.3 5.3 16.8 7.7
14 4.9 9.4 14.2 3.5 7.5 8.2 5.3 16.7 8.0
15 4.9 9.4 14.2 3.5 7.4 8.2 5.3 16.7 7.8
16 4.8 9.3 14.1 3.6 7.5 8.4 5.3 16.8 7.9
17 5.0 9.8 14.5 3.5 7.4 8.5 5.3 16.6 8.1
18 4.9 9.6 14.4 3.6 7.4 8.4 5.2 16.7 8.2
19 4.8 9.3 14.2 3.5 7.3 8.5 5.1 16.6 8.1
20 4.7 9.2 14.0 3.5 7.3 8.4 5.0 16.5 7.9
21 4.6 8.9 14.2 3.7 7.2 8.7 4.9 16.5 8.0
22 4.8 9.0 14.0 3.6 7.3 8.7 4.9 16.3 7.9
23 4.8 9.0 14.0 3.6 7.1 8.9 4.9 16.1 7.6
24 4.8 8.9 14.2 3.5 7.2 9.2 4.9 16.1 8.1
129
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
25 9.0 4.6 6.8 9.5 5.5 9.1 8.2 15.9 8.0
26 8.9 4.7 6.8 9.6 5.5 8.7 8.3 16.0 8.1
27 8.9 4.8 6.9 10.0 5.5 8.8 8.4 16.0 8.2
28 8.9 4.8 6.8 9.7 5.5 8.9 8.4 15.9 7.8
29 8.9 5.0 6.5 9.4 5.6 8.5 8.6 16.0 7.9
30 8.8 5.0 6.5 9.4 5.1 8.3 8.7 16.2 7.9
31 8.8 4.9 6.5 9.5 5.7 8.2 8.9 16.1 7.7
32 8.7 5.1 6.6 9.6 5.7 8.2 9.0 16.1 7.9
33 8.6 5.0 6.7 9.5 5.8 8.3 8.9 16.2 7.8
34 8.6 5.0 6.6 9.6 5.7 8.3 8.9 16.0 7.7
35 8.6 5.0 6.6 9.6 5.7 8.3 8.9 16.3 7.7
36 8.6 5.0 6.5 9.6 5.8 8.2 8.6 16.3 7.8
37 8.5 5.1 6.3 9.5 5.9 8.1 8.7 16.6 7.5
38 8.4 5.2 6.2 9.7 5.9 8.1 8.6 16.5 7.4
39 8.5 5.3 6.2 9.6 6.0 8.0 8.7 16.5 7.5
40 8.5 5.2 6.2 9.4 5.9 8.2 8.8 16.6 7.2
41 8.7 5.3 6.3 10.0 5.9 8.2 8.7 16.7 7.2
42 8.7 5.3 6.3 9.9 5.8 8.3 8.7 16.8 7.1
43 8.8 5.3 6.5 9.6 5.6 8.2 8.9 16.7 7.0
44 8.8 5.3 6.5 9.7 5.5 8.2 9.0 16.8 7.0
45 8.7 5.5 6.5 9.7 5.6 8.1 8.7 16.9 7.3
46 8.7 5.5 6.4 9.8 5.6 8.1 8.7 16.8 7.5
47 8.8 5.5 6.5 9.8 5.5 8.0 8.8 17.0 7.4
48 8.8 5.4 6.3 9.8 5.5 8.0 8.9 16.8 7.6
49 8.8 5.6 6.4 9.9 5.5 8.0 8.7 17.1 7.6
50 8.7 5.6 6.5 9.9 5.3 8.0 8.9 17.2 7.6
51 8.7 5.6 6.5 9.9 5.2 8.1 8.8 17.1 7.6
130
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
52 8.8 5.6 6.5 10.1 5.2 8.1 8.9 17.1 7.5
53 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.0 5.1 8.2 9.1 17.5 7.6
54 8.8 5.7 6.6 10.1 5.1 8.1 9.1 17.4 7.6
55 8.7 5.5 6.5 9.7 5.2 7.8 9.3 17.5 7.9
56 8.7 5.5 6.4 9.7 5.2 8.0 9.4 17.6 7.8
57 8.7 5.4 6.5 9.8 5.4 8.0 8.9 18.4 7.8
58 8.7 5.4 6.5 9.8 5.5 8.0 8.9 18.3 8.0
59 8.7 5.6 6.5 9.7 5.6 8.0 8.9 18.1 7.6
60 8.7 5.5 6.5 9.9 5.6 7.9 8.8 18.0 8.1
61 8.8 5.5 6.5 10.1 5.5 8.0 8.7 18.3 8.1
62 8.8 5.5 6.5 10.1 5.5 8.0 8.7 18.3 8.1
63 8.7 5.6 6.5 10.1 5.6 8.0 8.8 18.5 7.8
64 8.7 5.6 6.5 10.4 5.6 8.0 9.0 18.5 7.9
65 8.6 5.5 6.5 10.3 5.5 8.0 9.0 18.6 7.8
66 8.6 5.6 6.5 10.3 5.5 8.1 9.0 18.5 7.8
67 8.5 5.6 6.5 10.4 5.3 8.2 8.8 19.0 7.4
68 8.5 5.6 6.5 10.5 5.2 8.1 8.9 19.1 7.5
69 8.5 5.6 6.5 10.5 5.2 8.1 8.9 19.0 7.4
70 8.6 5.6 6.5 10.6 5.0 8.1 8.9 18.9 7.3
71 8.5 5.6 6.5 10.9 5.2 8.1 8.9 18.9 7.3
72 8.5 5.7 6.5 10.9 5.3 8.1 8.9 19.2 7.3
73 8.5 5.8 6.5 10.9 5.2 8.1 9.0 19.1 7.3
74 8.5 5.7 6.4 11.1 5.3 8.3 9.1 19.2 7.2
75 8.5 5.7 6.5 11.1 5.3 8.3 8.9 19.2 7.3
131
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
76 8.5 5.6 6.5 10.8 5.3 8.3 8.9 19.1 7.4
77 8.5 5.7 6.5 11.0 5.2 8.4 9.1 19.4 7.3
78 8.5 5.8 6.5 11.0 5.3 8.4 9.1 19.2 7.4
79 8.5 5.8 6.5 11.0 5.3 8.4 9.0 19.3 7.4
80 8.4 5.8 6.4 11.1 5.3 8.5 8.9 19.3 7.5
81 8.5 5.7 6.6 11.2 5.2 8.4 8.7 19.3 7.9
82 8.5 5.6 6.7 11.5 4.9 8.9 8.1 19.5 8.2
83 8.5 5.6 6.7 11.6 4.9 8.9 7.9 19.7 8.3
84 8.6 5.6 6.7 11.5 4.9 8.9 7.9 19.7 8.4
85 8.6 5.7 6.7 11.6 4.9 8.8 7.9 19.8 8.6
86 8.6 5.7 6.6 11.3 4.9 8.8 8.0 19.8 8.7
87 8.6 5.7 6.6 11.7 5.0 8.8 8.1 19.8 8.9
88 8.5 5.8 6.7 11.5 4.9 8.8 8.1 19.8 8.9
89 8.5 5.7 6.7 11.7 4.9 8.8 8.2 19.9 9.1
90 8.5 5.7 6.7 11.7 5.0 8.9 8.2 19.7 9.4
91 8.5 5.7 6.6 11.8 5.0 8.9 8.4 19.8 9.4
92 8.5 5.8 6.6 11.8 5.1 8.8 8.3 19.6 9.8
93 8.5 5.8 6.6 11.8 5.1 8.8 8.4 19.6 9.9
94 8.5 5.8 6.7 11.8 5.1 8.9 8.4 19.6 9.8
95 8.4 5.9 6.6 11.8 5.1 8.8 8.5 19.5 10.0
96 8.4 6.0 6.5 11.8 5.1 8.8 8.2 19.7 10.1
97 8.4 6.0 6.5 11.8 5.1 8.8 8.2 19.7 10.1
98 8.5 6.0 6.7 11.6 5.2 8.9 8.4 19.6 10.4
99 8.5 6.1 6.6 11.7 5.2 8.9 8.5 19.6 10.5
100 8.5 6.0 6.6 12.0 5.2 8.8 8.5 19.6 10.7
132
Month 10-25 25-30 30-35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65-80 80-90 90-100
101 8.5 6.1 6.6 11.9 5.2 8.8 8.6 19.6 10.8
102 8.4 6.1 6.7 11.9 5.2 8.8 8.5 19.5 10.5
103 8.5 6.1 6.6 12.1 5.2 8.8 8.5 19.6 10.5
104 8.4 6.1 6.6 12.1 5.2 8.8 8.2 19.6 10.5
105 8.4 6.1 6.5 12.1 5.1 8.8 8.2 19.2 10.7
106 8.4 6.1 6.6 12.1 5.2 8.8 8.4 19.1 11.0
107 8.4 6.1 6.6 12.0 5.2 8.9 8.4 19.5 10.6
108 8.4 6.1 6.6 11.9 5.1 8.8 8.2 19.4 11.1
109 8.4 6.1 6.6 12.2 5.1 8.8 8.3 19.4 11.1
110 8.3 6.1 6.6 12.2 5.1 8.8 8.1 19.5 11.1
111 8.3 6.1 6.6 12.3 5.0 8.7 8.1 19.4 11.3
112 8.3 6.0 6.5 12.2 5.0 8.7 7.9 19.5 11.3
113 8.3 6.2 6.3 12.3 5.0 8.6 7.9 19.4 11.7
114 8.2 6.2 6.4 12.3 5.1 8.6 7.9 19.8 11.8
115 8.3 6.2 6.5 12.3 5.1 8.7 7.8 19.9 11.8
116 8.3 6.2 6.6 12.2 5.2 8.7 7.8 19.9 11.9
117 8.2 6.2 6.6 12.2 5.2 8.5 7.8 19.8 12.3
118 8.2 6.2 6.6 12.1 5.2 8.5 7.8 19.8 12.2
119 8.1 6.2 6.6 12.2 5.2 8.5 7.7 19.9 12.4
120 8.1 6.2 6.5 12.2 5.2 8.4 7.7 19.8 12.4
121 8.2 6.3 6.5 12.3 5.2 8.5 8.0 19.5 12.3
122 8.2 6.3 6.6 12.3 5.3 8.6 7.7 19.4 12.2
123 8.1 6.3 6.6 12.3 5.3 8.7 7.7 19.5 12.4
124 7.9 6.3 6.6 12.3 5.3 8.6 7.8 19.6 12.2
125 8.0 6.2 6.4 12.6 5.2 8.7 7.8 19.7 12.3
126 8.1 6. 3 6.4 12.6 5.1 8.6 8.0 19.8 12.7
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Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
1 11.5 14.8 8.4 3.1 7.4 76.8 25.3
2 11.4 14.5 8.2 3.1 6.7 75.9 21.8
3 11.3 14.7 8.0 3.1 6.5 72.7 20.6
4 11.4 14.8 7.9 2.9 6.5 71.8 19.3
5 11.5 13.9 7.4 3.1 6.1 67.8 18.4
6 11.3 14.3 7.3 3.1 6.1 67.9 18.9
7 11.4 14.15 7.6 3.1 5.85 68.1 18.2
8 11.3 14.4 7.4 3.1 6.5 69.35 20.6
9 11.3 14.95 7.4 3.3 5.6 68.65 21.0
10 11.6 15.2 7.6 3.3 5.9 70.1 21.2
11 11.4 15.4 6.8 3.3 5.9 70.6 22.4
12 11.65 15.6 7.0 3.1 6.1 69.3 22.3
13 11.0 15.8 7.5 3.1 5.9 68.7 22.0
14 11.0 16.4 7.5 3.1 5.2 65.8 20.7
15 11.2 16.2 7.3 3.1 4.8 65.6 19.8
16 11.3 16.4 7.0 3.1 4.6 63.9 19.7
17 11.3 16.5 7.7 3.1 4.3 62.8 20.4
18 10.9 16.6 8.1 3.1 4.3 62.0 20.1
19 11.0 16.8 7.8 3.1 4.1 62.9 20.8
20 10.9 16.9 7.8 3.1 4.5 65.0 21.8
21 10.5 17.7 8.1 2.9 5.0 61.6 19.4
22 10.9 17.5 7.6 2.9 4.4 61.9 19.0
23 10.8 17.5 8.5 2.8 4.4 59.3 17.3
24 10.6 17.2 7.6 2.6 4.1 60.3 18.9
25 10.4 17.2 7.5 2.6 4.1 60.5 18.4
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Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
26 10.5 15.4 7.5 2.6 5.0 58.8 17.6
27 10.5 17.4 7.3 2.6 4.6 59.8 18.5
28 10.4 17.2 7.5 2.6 4.4 57.0 16.2
29 10.3 17.1 7.6 2.6 4.1 55.2 15.9
30 10.1 17.1 7.7 2.6 3.9 53.0 14.5
31 10.1 16.9 7.8 2.6 4.6 51.7 14.5
32 9.6 16.5 7.8 2.6 4.1 49.4 15.5
33 9.4 17.2 8.1 2.6 4.1 48.3 13.9
34 9.7 17.2 8.1 2.6 3.5 48.7 15.7
35 9.7 17.3 8.1 2.6 3.5 49.6 15.0
36 9.7 17.5 8.1 2.6 3.5 54.1 18.6
37 10.4 17.4 8.4 2.5 3.7 55.9 18.6
38 10.4 17.1 8.3 2.5 3.5 55.6 17.6
39 10.4 16.5 8.3 2.5 3.3 55.6 18.1
40 10.4 16.5 8.0 2.5 3.3 56.4 18.4
41 10.3 16.1 7.8 2.5 2.8 55.6 17.6
42 10.3 16.1 7.5 2.5 2.8 55.5 18.4
43 10.5 16.4 7.9 2.5 2.8 57.2 18.9
44 10.4 16.4 8.1 2.5 2.8 59.4 21.7
45 10.3 16.6 8.5 2.2 2.6 62.1 23.9
46 10.4 16.7 8.5 2.2 2.6 62.0 23.2
47 10.5 16.5 8.5 2.2 2.2 60.6 22.2
48 10.5 16.5 8.5 2.2 2.2 60.8 20.0
49 10.6 16.4 8.5 2.2 2.6 61.9 20.2
50 10.8 16.5 8.5 2.2 3.0 61.6 19.6
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Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
51 10.8 16.7 8.3 2.2 3.0 61.6 19.3
52 10.8 16.5 8.1 2.2 3.2 61.3 18.5
53 10.6 16.5 8.3 2.2 3.2 60.3 18.3
54 10.5 16.7 8.3 2.2 3.0 60.1 18.1
55 10.4 16.2 8.3 2.5 3.0 60.1 17.0
56 10.5 16.2 8.2 2.5 3.0 61.7 18.1
57 10.6 16.2 8.2 2.6 3.0 63.1 18.4
58 11.0 16.1 8.5 2.4 2.8 63.9 17.6
59 10.8 16.1 8.3 2.4 2.6 62.6 18.0
60 10.8 16.0 8.3 2.4 2.2 64.7 18.4
61 10.8 16.1 8.2 2.3 2.8 63.7 18.8
62 10.8 16.1 8.2 2.3 2.8 63.7 18.8
63 11.2 16.2 8.0 2.6 3.1 66.6 18.0
64 11.4 16.4 8.2 2.6 3.1 65.5 17.1
65 11.4 16.5 8.2 2.4 3.1 65.6 17.8
66 11.1 16.2 8.3 2.4 2.6 65.9 18.7
67 10.7 16.4 7.7 2.4 2.4 65.4 18.7
68 11.1 16.9 7.4 2.4 2.8 66.2 20.9
69 11.1 16.9 7.4 2.4 2.6 66.2 20.9
70 11.0 17.2 8.0 2.4 2.6 66.0 20.7
71 11.2 17.4 8.0 2.4 3.0 67.5 23.4
72 11.3 17.3 8.2 2.4 3.3 67.9 23.8
73 11.2 17.7 7.8 2.4 3.3 68.6 22.7
74 11.4 17.7 7.9 2.4 3.1 71.5 23.7
75 11.2 17.7 8.2 2.2 2.4 71.2 22.6
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Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
76 11.6 18.0 8.2 2.2 2.8 70.7 23.6
77 11.7 17.7 8.0 2.2 2.8 70.6 24.1
78 11.8 17.9 8.2 2.2 3.3 71.7 25.1
79 11.6 18.0 7.8 2.2 3.1 71.2 24.2
80 11.6 18.0 7.8 2.2 3.1 71.0 23.6
81 11.8 17.7 7.5 2.7 2.4 71.5 21.1
82 11.4 18.1 7.8 2.9 2.7 72.2 21.9
83 11.4 18.2 7.8 2.9 2.7 72.2 23.8
84 11.4 18.3 7.8 2.9 2.6 71.6 24.9
85 11.2 18.3 7.7 2.9 2.6 71.3 25.8
86 11.5 18.1 7.7 2.9 2.6 71.8 25.8
87 11.1 18.4 7.9 2.9 2.9 73.2 25.6
88 11.2 18.7 7.9 2.9 2.7 73.1 26.0
89 11.1 18.7 7.6 2.9 2.7 73.9 26.0
90 11.4 18.6 8.0 2.9 2.8 73.9 26.3
91 11.1 18.6 7.9 2.9 2.6 74.4 26.0
92 11.4 18.9 7.9 2.9 2.9 74.4 24.7
93 11.7 19.0 7.7 2.9 3.1 75.8 26.2
94 11.7 18.8 7.5 2.9 2.6 77.3 25.9
95 11.8 18.7 7.4 2.9 2.6 77.3 26.2
96 12.0 18.6 7.7 2.7 2.9 76.5 25.5
97 12.0 18.6 7.7 2.7 2.9 76.5 25.5
98 11.8 18.3 7.1 2.9 2.9 75.9 27.3
99 11.8 18.3 7.1 2.9 2.9 76.4 27.3
100 11.6 19.5 6.9 2.9 2.6 77.5 26.6
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Month 100-125 125-150 150-175 175-200 200-225 225-300 300+
101 11.6 18.8 7.1 2.9 2.6 78.1 26.6
102 11.7 18.9 7.4 2.7 2.9 76.8 25.6
103 11.5 19.1 7.4 2.7 2.9 77.3 26.3
104 11.5 18.9 7.4 2.7 2.8 75.9 26.7
105 11.8 19.1 7.3 2.4 3.1 76.7 27.3
106 11.6 20.0 7.4 2.7 2.9 76.7 27.0
107 11.6 20.1 7.7 2.7 2.4 77.3 27.2
108 11.9 20.8 7.5 2.7 2.4 79.2 26.6
109 11.7 20.6 7.7 2.7 2.4 78.7 26.8
110 11.7 20.5 7.5 2.7 2.6 80.3 26.9
111 11.7 20.9 8.0 2.7 2.6 80.9 26.6
112 11.9 21.2 8.1 2.5 2.2 81.5 27.3
113 11.7 21.3 7.8 2.5 2.2 82.8 26.4
114 11.8 22.1 7.8 2.7 2.2 80.4 26.7
115 11.7 22.5 8.0 2.7 2.0 80.6 26.6
116 11.8 22.2 7.5 2.5 2.2 81.2 26.0
117 11.9 22.1 7.4 2.5 2.2 80.9 25.6
118 11.8 21.8 7.7 2.5 2.0 80.4 27.3
119 11.8 21.4 7.5 2.5 2.0 80.0 27.2
120 11.9 21.4 7.5 2.5 2.0 80.5 27.2
121 11.4 21.7 6.7 2.4 1.8 82.1 27.4
122 11.4 21.9 7.1 2.5 1.6 84.6 28.7
123 11.6 21.6 7.3 2.5 1.4 84.9 27.9
124 11.3 21.0 6.8 2.5 1.6 85.2 27.9
125 11.4 21.3 6.8 2.5 1.9 84.4 27.3
126 11.0 21.5 7.3 2.7 1.9 84.5 26.9
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